The traditional economics of innovation, inspired by Schumpeter and more recent advances on his work, seem unable to explain why firms with similar external conditions may show greatly different performance in innovation. Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic effects of different modes of coordination between firm members. The process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central to the dynamics of corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by discussing how various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological innovation. We then describe three main channels -corporate ownership, corporate finance and labour -through which a system of corporate governance shapes a firm's innovation activity. Finally, we examine the relationship between country-level institutional settings, national patterns of corporate governance and the aggregate innovation activity of corporations. We conclude by suggesting that future research should focus more deeply on the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and on their joint effect on firm innovation.

University students' drop-out is a crucial issue for the universities' efficiency evaluation and funding. In this paper, we analyze the drop-out rate of the Economics and Business faculty of Sapienza University of Rome. We use administrative data on 9,725 undergraduates students enrolled in three-years bachelor programs from 2001 to 2007 and perform a Generalized Linear Mixed Model. Our aim is to improve the general understanding of the students' withdrawing focusing on personal characteristics of students rather than on institutional aspects of the university. The empirical analysis unveils the statistically significant effect of students' characteristics, like citizenship and income, while the main findings relate a high drop-out probability to a high secondary school final mark and a low individual students' performance

University drop-out is a topic of increasing concern in Italy as well as in other countries. In empirical analysis, university drop-out is generally measured by means of a binary variable indicating the drop-out versus retention. In this paper,we argue that the withdrawal decision is one of the possible outcomes of a set of four alternatives: retention in the same faculty, drop out, change of faculty within the same university, and change of institution. We examine individual-level data collected by the administrative offices of "Sapienza" University of Rome, which cover 117 072 students enrolling full-time for a 3-year degree in the academic years from 2001/2002 to 2006/2007. Relying on a non-parametric maximum likelihood approach in a finite mixture context, we introduce a multinomial latent effects model with endogeneity that accounts for both heterogeneity and omitted covariates. Our estimation results show that the decisions to change faculty or university have their own peculiarities, thus we suggest that caution should be used in interpreting results obtained without modeling all the relevant alternatives that students face. © 2011 Taylor & Francis

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A very well established economic literature maintains that State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient comparatively to privately-owned ones (POEs). In this paper we argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to the State ownership per se, rather it is caused by some conditions other than ownership which SOEs often, but not necessarily, relate to. In particular, we focus on dynamic efficiency -specifically, the production of technological innovation -of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. We suggest that targeted measures aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference, though being complex and difficult to implement, can be much more (positively) incisive on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile State ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.Keywords: State-owned enterprises, innovation, privatization.JEL classification: H11, L33, O31, P12. * Department of Economics, University "G. d'Annunzio", Viale Pindaro 42 -65127 Pescara, Italy (email: f.belloc@unich.it). I certify that I have the right to deposit the contribution with MPRA.