In this article we analyse some disturbing trends in the Danish labour market: while collective bargaining coverage is still relatively high, union density has been declining and—worse than that—there has been a substantial shift away from recognised and in favour of alternative unionism. The alternative unions are not parties to collective agreements, and they offer membership much cheaper than the recognised unions, in effect taking a free ride on the institutional supports that used to be effective only for the recognised unions. The article explains this conundrum by pointing to the political and institutional backgrounds to this development, which threatens to erode the very basis for the Danish collective bargaining system. On the background of general statistics and of a general employee survey, we point out the reasons behind the challenges confronting the recognised unions, pointing out that the recognised unions must become both more efficient in the member services and more cost efficient, if they wish to halt the present downhill trend.

Why did union officials from a high-union-density country like Denmark choose to import an organising strategy from low-density countries such as the US and the UK? Drawing on in-depth interviews with key union officials and internal documents, the authors of this article argue two key points. First, rather than unions settling for a semi-automatic response to membership decline, the ‘organising model’ was actively imported as a strategic tool for challenging alternative responses to membership decline. Second, the organising model was actively translated into a Danish context and most unions cherry-pick some elements while leaving fundamental aspects out. The study nevertheless indicates that a lack of coherency and model-fit to Danish industrial relations might hamper the positive effects of the organising strategy.

This article looks at strikes by employees in the public sector, discusses the theoretical background to these conflicts and shows – based on a case study of three strikes in the Danish public sector – how different union strategies lead to very different outcomes in terms of economic gains and losses, ranging from a slightly positive result to a negative result from which it will take eight to ten years to recover. This is of great importance because the challenge facing public sector unions is different from that of their counterparts: private sector unions struggle with the owners of capital, while public sector unions trying to move up the wage hierarchy cannot expect much help from fellow public sector unions, often quite the reverse.

OK18 blev en af de mest højdramatiske overenskomstfornyelser i den offentlige sektors historie. Overenskomstforhandlingerne kom i helt nye situationer, som ikke var prøvet før. Alle tre områder: stat, kommuner og regioner endte alle i Forligsinstitutionen på samme tid, og begge parter varslede konfl ikt. I denne artikel undersøger vi – via kvalitativt data kombineret med teori om magtressourcer – hvorfor det kom så vidt, og hvordan det til trods for højspændte forhandlinger alligevel lykkes parterne at indgå forlig.

This article investigates the use of collective action in the public sector by analysing the Danish teacher lock-out in 2013. The social partners in the public sector in Denmark (and the other Nordic countries) engage in negotiations and reach agreements regarding wages and working conditions in accordance with an institutional set-up developed in the private sector. This also applies to the use of the so-called weapons of conflict – strikes/blockades and lock-outs/boycotts – in connection with labour disputes if the parties are unable to reach agreement through negotiations or mediation. But there is a big difference in the premises and conditions upon which collective industrial conflict as an institutionalised form of collective action proceeds when comparing the public and private sectors in Denmark. The article shows how the use of collective industrial conflicts in the public sector has a number of built-in systemic institutional flaws, as the public employers are the budgetary authority and legislators at the same time. This is not a new finding; however, these multiple roles become problematic when public employers use the lock-out weapon offensively in combination with state intervention to end the dispute, which was the case during the teacher lock-out in 2013 in Denmark. The article concludes with the presentation of a number of proposed institutional adjustments for bringing the public bargaining model into balance.