Capital structure, dividend policy and corporate governance are today significantly influencing academic debates on firm's value, while they can increase profitability and shareholder's value in long term. This paper seeks to investigate the affects of corporate governance mechanisms and financing activities on firms' performance. A sample of 84 firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange for a period of five years from 2007 to 2011 was selected. These firms were chosen by employing random classified sampling. The study used Return on Investment (ROI) and Tobin's Q as proxies for performance and developed multiple and single regression models, mean tests and correlation coefficients to test the hypotheses. The findings reveal that corporate governance, financing decisions and capital structures are affected by firms' performance.

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Intellectual capital is a new matter that theoretically is suggested in the few

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and the sustainable growth of companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange. Board characteristics in this study include the size of the board, number of board meetings, the share of non-bound managers of the board, duality of managing director duties and maintaining shares of the Board of Directors. According to previous similar studies, firm size and financial leverage are considered as control variables. In this study, statistical population includes all companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange. Some restrictions applied on the Statistical population and a sample consisted of 54 companies was selected. Data analysis was conducted on data collected from 2006 to 2012. Multiple linear regression analysis and correlation coefficient methods were used for data analysis and obtaining hypothesis test results. The results indicate that there is no significant relationship between the size of the board, share of non-bound managers of the board, number of board meetings, maintaining shares of the Board of Directors and sustainable growth while there is a significant negative relationship between Managing Director duality of duties and sustainable growth rate. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social SciencesJune , Vol. 4, No. 6 ISSN: 2222 385 www.hrmars.com Keywords: Board of Directors size, number of meetings, non-duty managers, maintaining board share, sustainable growth. 1-IntroductionAgency issue is main topic of Board of Directors discussion. This is because conflict of interest between managers and shareholders leads to the creation of agency costs. Distributed ownership (decentralized) causes agency problems because ability and incentives of shareholders to control management will be reduced due to their small shares. In addition, shareholders can often invest in several companies to reduce risk through diversification. They are investing in their stock portfolio for the hope of future profits not for the hope of a better future in a particular company. In addition, dispersed shareholders have no the ability to control management effectively because they do not have sufficient information and expertise necessary to make correct decisions. On the other hand, centralized ownership significantly motivates the major shareholders. Accordingly, they also will have more motivation to improve the company operations and management control as their share in the company increases. There are obvious benefits of centralized ownership but some arguments against this issue are also true. First, shareholders are generally risk averse. Second, when excessive control by centralized ownership occurs, internal stakeholders (managers and employees) will be discouraged of costly investments. Third, centralized ownership may cause agency problems in another way, i.e. conflict arise between major shareholders and other stakeholders. Major shareholders will have necessary incentives to use their control situat...

This study mainly aims at investigating the impact of conservatism on the quality of the accounting information and decisions of the shareholders and the