We study a persuasion game in which biased—possibly opposed—experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision maker may prefer to solicit advice from just one biased expert even when others—including those biased in the opposite direction (singular)—are available.

The lack of hard evidence in allegations about sexual misconduct makes it difficult to separate true allegations from false ones. We provide a model in which victims and potential libelers face the same costs and benefits from making an allegation, but the tendency for perpetrators of sexual misconduct to engage in repeat offenses allows semiseparation to occur, which lends credibility to such allegations. Our model also explains why reports about sexual misconduct are often delayed, and why the public rationally assigns less credibility to these delayed reports. (JEL D82, J16, K14, K42)

We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP). Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects a (Blackwell) more informative experiment to bring Bob’s posterior mean closer to Anne’s prior mean. We apply the result in two contexts of games of asymmetric information: voluntary testing or certification, and costly signaling or falsification. IVP can be used to determine how an agent’s behavior responds to additional exogenous or endogenous information. We discuss economic implications. (JEL C11, D82, D84)

We study a service provider, who, at the time of offering a contract, is better informed than the potential client. A service provider that is hired to increase the client's chance of a gain, an “enhancer,” may be better informed of whether the client has a big or small opportunity. A service provider that is hired to reduce the client's chance of a loss, a “problem solver,” may be better informed of whether the client has a big or small problem. We show that an enhancer predominantly offers a contingent contract, while a problem solver predominantly offers a flat fee due to their signaling incentives. This explains the differences in real‐world contracts and also provides a novel explanation for the existence of low‐powered incentive contracts. We evaluate the policy intervention that limits the contingent part of the service providers' contracts.