This paper investigates the relationship between methodological individualism (MI) and agent-based simulation (ABS). We use a thesis defended by Caterina Marchionni and Petri Ylikoski (2013) as the starting point of our approach. According to this thesis, since MI is often considered to be a reductionist orientation, it is confusing and meaningless to assume that ABS, which is a non-reductionist and emergentist explanatory model, is committed to MI. We criticise this view and focus on the problem of the proper definition of MI. We explain that MI is compatible with the ABS strategy because reductionism is only the most simplistic variant of MI and argue that ABS explanations must be regarded as explanations in terms of non-reductionist MI.

Popper’s theory of World 3 is often regarded as incongruent with his defense of methodological individualism. This article criticizes this widespread view. Methodological individualism is said to be at odds with three crucial assumptions of the theory of World 3: (a) the impossibility of reducing World 3 to subjective mental states because it exists objectively, (b) the view that the mental functions cannot be explained by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms, and (c) the idea that World 3 has causal power and influences both individual minds and actions. This article demonstrates that the inconsistency thesis stems from a confusion between methodological individualism as understood by Popper and reductionism. The reasons for this confusion are analyzed and clarified. It is argued that two variants of methodological individualism can be distinguished, and that unlike psychologistic individualism, Popper’s nonatomistic individualism is fully consistent with his theory of World 3.

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