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In this paper we have analysed the innovation processes occurring in several crossindustry technology partnerships in order to suggest some key managerial issues pertaining to the effectiveness of these increasingly popular initiatives. Our general proposition, based on an extensive literature review and clinical research, is that the managerial hurdles in partnerships frequently offset, and in some cases eliminate, the expected innovation advantages. We submit that there is a fundamental tension between the dynamics of innovation and the logic of partnering. The extent of the tension, however, depends on the nature of the innovation project and on the characteristics of the partnership. Thus we recommend that managers involved in the formation of joint-R&D agreements should carry out an innovation-partnering assessment to design an appropriate management structure that would minimise the 'tension'. Lastly, we suggest some ingredients for carrying out such an assessment, and directions for further research.

In this article we report on the design, prototyping and results of a research effort aimed at identifying whether and how trust affects the innovativeness of a partnership between two players. The methodology combined an experiment and two questionnaires. The research aimed to increase our understanding of trust and its impact on the innovative outcome of cooperation and to derive some guidance for economic actors, namely R&D managers and executives who intend to build innovation‐oriented relationships with their business partners. Specifically, we investigated the effect of trust on partners' creativity and willingness to invest financially in a joint development. Our results show that more trustful partners invest higher amounts in the alliance, while there seems to be an optimum amount of mutual trust between partners who maximize their joint creativity and innovativeness; if the level of mutual trust is below or above this threshold, their joint creativity seems to increase less or even to decrease. Our findings suggest that joint development projects should always include explicit trust development activities at the beginning of the project, and that the amount of trust in the joint team should be monitored to avoid the negative consequences of excessive trust.

There is a widespread belief in the business community that firms can rely on the market for buying and selling technological opportunities. The argument is: with so much technology development going on in the world, ‘there must be somebody somewhere who has the technology we need.’ According to this belief, acquiring new technology just boils down to finding the supplier, possibly with the help of a specialized intermediary. Several large firms have indeed developed ambitious mechanisms for acquiring the needed technological know‐how as they proceed to make and market a new product. We contend that this concept of the technology transfer process is erroneous, as it conflicts with actual practice. The very high transaction costs entailed leave considerable room for opportunistic behavior and are more likely to occur when the parties do not know each other. An effective way to reduce transaction costs, therefore, is to limit technology transfers to the firm's partners, i.e. organizations with which the firm has already interacted in the past. Our research provides evidence that successful technology transfers typically take place between suppliers and buyers who had business relationships before considering a technology agreement. In addition, we report findings that companies using intermediaries (technological opportunities catalogues, databases, fairs, etc.) have been disappointed in their attempts to find new technologies from unknown sources. Because of the high risk of opportunistic behavior, it is practically impossible to assess the value of a technology without knowing who sells it. Similarly, the technology transfer capabilities of a company are difficult to appraise without prior knowledge through business interaction. To a certain extent, it may be better to buy any technology from a partner that one knows well than to buy a supposedly good technology from a firm with which one has had no experience. To put it bluntly: the identity of the partner may actually matter more than the technology being traded! Consequently, the relevant framework for technology transfer is built on a ‘network concept’ rather than the ‘market concept’. Firms wishing to acquire new technology should turn first to their network of trusted business partners, looking for available technological opportunities instead of trying to buy technology from unrelated organizations.

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