No abstract

In the past years, several authors have proposed theoretical models of faking at selection. Although these models greatly improved our understanding of applicant faking, they mostly offer static approaches. In contrast, we propose a model of applicant faking derived from signaling theory, which describes faking as a dynamic process driven by applicants' and organizations' adaptations in a competitive environment. We argue that faking depends on applicants' motivation and capacity to fake, which are determined by individual differences in skills, abilities, and stable attitudes, as well as by perceptions of the competition, but also on applicants' perceived opportunities versus risks to fake, which are contingent upon organizations' measures to increase the costs of faking. We further explain how selection outcomes can trigger adaptations of applicants, such as faking in subsequent selection encounters, and of organizations, such as changes in measures making faking costly for applicants in the long term.

Following the recent avian influenza and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreaks, public trust in medical and political authorities is emerging as a new predictor of compliance with officially recommended protection measures. In a two-wave longitudinal survey of adults in French-speaking Switzerland, trust in medical organizations longitudinally predicted actual vaccination status 6 months later, during the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccination campaign. No other variables explained significant amounts of variance. Trust in medical organizations also predicted perceived efficacy of officially recommended protection measures (getting vaccinated, washing hands, wearing a mask, sneezing into the elbow), as did beliefs about health issues (perceived vulnerability to disease, threat perceptions). These findings show that in the case of emerging infectious diseases, actual behavior and perceived efficacy of protection measures may have different antecedents. Moreover, they suggest that public trust is a crucial determinant of vaccination behavior and underscore the practical importance of managing trust in disease prevention campaigns.

Drawing on theories of stereotype content and role congruity, this research investigated the role of stereotypes for employment discrimination against older candidates. Study 1 investigated the content of stereotypes about older workers, focusing on warmth and competence as the two core dimensions in social judgement. As predicted, older workers were perceived as less competent but warmer than younger workers. Studies 2 and 3 investigated how these stereotypes interact with job requirements to predict age bias in an experimental setting. Further, they tested if warmth-and competence-related stereotypical inferences mediate the relation between candidate age and selection bias. Results showed that age bias was robust. Older candidates were discriminated against, even if the job primarily required warmth-related qualities, and independently of evaluators' own age or professional experience in human resources. Moreover, age bias was mediated by competence-related stereotypical inferences. Age bias was also mediated by inferences related to warmth but those inferences were opposite to the highwarmth older worker stereotype identified in Study 1. Implications of the findings for theoretical approaches to age discrimination and for organizational practice designed to combat age discrimination are discussed.