Previous research has shown that those who won an election are more satisfied with the way democracy works than those who lost. What is not clear, however, is whether it is the fact of winning (losing), per se, that generates (dis)satisfaction with democracy. The current study explores this winner/loser gap with the use of the 1997 Canadian federal election panel study. It makes a theoretical and methodological contribution to our understanding of the factors that foster satisfaction with democracy. At the theoretical level, we argue that voters gain different utility from winning at the constituency and national levels in a parliamentary system, and that their expectations about whether they will win or lose affect their degree of satisfaction with democracy. On the methodological front, our analysis includes a control group (non-voters) and incorporates a control for the level of satisfaction prior to the election. The results indicate that the effect of winning and losing on voters' satisfaction with democracy is significant even when controlling for ex ante satisfaction before the election takes place, and that the outcome of the election in the local constituency matters as much as the outcome of the national election. They fail to show, however, that expectations about the outcome of the election play a significant role in shaping satisfaction with democracy.The extant literature has provided ample empirical evidence that support for democratic institutions in liberal democracies varies among citizens. More precisely, the literature has convincingly demonstrated that those who vote for the winning party in electoral contests are generally more satisfied with democracy than those who vote for the losing parties.Yet we know relatively little about how and why this winner/loser gap is produced. We do not know whether winners become more satisfied (and losers more dissatisfied) immediately after the election or whether the difference emerges before the election. We do not know whether losers are more or less dissatisfied than those who do not play the game, non-voters. We do not know whether winning (or losing) in national elections matters more than winning (or losing) in local ones. Finally, we do not know whether expectations about the outcome of the election affect the extent to which winners and losers are satisfied with the way democracy works.This article examines the determinants of the winner/loser gap with the use of the 1997 Canadian Election Study (CES). Building on previous work on the subject, we develop a model that discriminates winners and losers at the local and national levels, includes non-voters and takes into account voters' expectations about whether they will win or lose. Our results indicate that the effect of

This large cross-sectional survey of policy analysts working in Quebec ministries (Canada) shows that direct interactions with academic researchers are among the most significant correlates of the consultation of scientific articles, academic research reports and academic books/chapters, but by very little compared to other correlates such as reported access to electronic bibliographic databases, training type, continuing professional development and perceived relevance of research evidence. Many correlates were found to have similar predictive power and, taken individually, all correlates have somewhat low predictive power. Interestingly, statistical simulations show that to achieve a larger predictive power, significant correlates must be manipulated simultaneously. Large variations were observed across policy sectors.

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To what extent does public support for subnational officials fluctuate in response to local rather than national performance? Are the policy failures of subnational officials reliably punished by voters? Drawing upon both individual and aggregate level data, this article attempts to shed new light on these questions about the politics of decentralization by exploring electoral outcomes and public opinion at the subnational level in Argentina. Consistent with referendum voting models, this analysis suggests that the fate of candidates in both national and subnational elections is shaped by the performance of the incumbent presidential administration. Moreover, to the extent that subnational performance has an electoral impact, voters do not necessarily respond in ways that enhance electoral accountability. Voters not only blame and reward subnational officials for national performance, but also attribute responsibility for subnational performance to national authorities. The implications with respect to the impact of decentralized decision making on democratic accountability are decidedly mixed and anything but consistent with the argument that decentralization results in a closer match between citizen preferences and the allocation of public resources.2 Jonathan Rodden, 'The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World',

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