We present a method for decomposing wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and payments resulting from the exercise of market power. The method also parses actual variable costs into the minimum variable costs necessary to meet demand and increased production costs caused by market power and other market ine±ciencies. Using data from

This paper measures the unilateral incentive each of the five largest electricity suppliers in the California had to exercise market power in the state's wholesale market during the five month period June 1 to September 30 of 1998September 30 of , 1999September 30 of and 2000. Using the actual bids submitted to the California Independent System Operator's (CAISO) real-time energy market, I compute the hourly price elasticity of the ex post residual demand curve faced by each supplier evaluated at the marketclearing price for that hour. The inverse of this hourly ex post residual demand elasticity quantifies the extent to which that supplier is able to raise the hourly real-time energy price above its marginal cost of supplying the last megawatt-hour (MWh) it sells in the CAISO's real-time energy market. I use the average hourly value of the inverse of the firm-level residual demand elasticity over the four month sample period of each year as a summary measure of the extent of unilateral market power possessed by each supplier. For each firm, this measure of unilateral market power is significantly higher in 2000 relative to the corresponding firm-level values in 1998 and 1999. For each of the five firms, this measure is slightly higher in 1998 than 1999. The firm-level results presented below are consistent with the view that the enormous increase in the amount market power exercised in the California market beginning in June of 2000 documented in Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) was due to a substantial increase in the amount of unilateral market power possessed each of the five large suppliers in California.1

This paper provides estimates of the trade impacts of U.S. antiduznping law and the detemilnants of suit filing activity from 1980-1985. We study three possible channels through which the threat or mere possibility of antidumping duties can restrict trade which we believe, when combined with the direct effects of duties, capture most of the trade effects of antidumping Jaw. We refer to these three non-duty effects as the Investigation effect, the suspension effect, and the withdrawal effect. Investigation effects occur when an antiduinping investigation takes place; suspension effects occur under so-called "suspension agreements"; and withdrawal effects occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final detcm,ination. We find substantial trade restrictions associated with the first two effects, but not with the third. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that some firms inkinie antidumping procedures for the trade restricting investigation effects alone.

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This paper develops three asymptotically equivalent tests for examining the validity of imposing linear inequality restrictions on the parameters of linear econometric models. First we consider the model .v = X/3 + e. where r is N(O,8), and the hypothesis test H: R/l 1 r versus K: p E R". Later we generalize this testing framework to the linear simultaneous equations model. We show that the Joint asymptotic distribution of these test statistics and the test statistics from the hypothesis test H: RP = I versus K: R/3 2 r is a weighted sum of two sets of independent X'-distributions. We also derive a useful duality relation between the multivariate inequality constraints test developed here and the multivariate one-sided hypothesis test. In small samples, these three test statistics satisfy inequalities similar to those derived by Berndt and Savin (1977) for the case of equality constraints.The paper also contains an illustrative application of this testing technique.