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There has been an increasing focus in the past few decades on public health risk associated with distribution systems and, as a result, an increasing focus on possible expanded regulatory requirements for them. However, despite significant advances in understanding and managing distribution system water quality in recent years, there are still critical areas of uncertainty and knowledge gaps that must be filled in order to better understand public health risks and to cost‐effectively minimize them. The research and information collection activities identified through the Research and Information Collection Partnership (RICP) will result in more effective and pragmatic regulation, underpinning rulemaking decisions with sound, credible science. The RICP represents collaboration between the water utility community and regulators toward a common goal of public health protection. RICP activities are expected to support future risk management decisions by the drinking water community, such as development of guidance, best management practices, policy, and regulation for improved distribution system management. Guiding these efforts is the RICP priorities document, which is a roadmap of research and information collection activities that should be undertaken by water suppliers, federal and state agencies, and other stakeholders over the coming four to five years. Water utility support of and participation in these activities is vital to their success, and water suppliers may also use this information for education and training purposes.

This article discusses information disclosure and security information protection at water utilities. It focuses on security‐oriented vulnerability assessments (VAs) that may be used by terrorists as a roadmap of key system components/processes if reported to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as required by the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. Because of this concern, the Bioterrorism Act exempted VAs from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) release. Contradicting this, most water utilities were already subject to state “sunshine laws” that required disclosure of most information requested by any member of the public. Consequently, the article discusses how water utilities face a difficult and ongoing challenge of identifying and managing the release of potentially sensitive information.

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This article discusses the simultaneous occurrence of certain events that can cause a major disaster in a utility's distribution system. Specifically, the article discusses the top four concerns for distribution systems, as indicated by actual records of contamination and waterborne disease outbreaks, including: cross‐connections and backflow of contaminated water; contamination resulting from storage facility design, operation, or maintenance; contamination caused by main installation, repair, or rehabilitation practices; and, contaminant intrusion caused by pressure conditions and physical gaps in distribution system infrastructure.