We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average. Copyright Springer 2006Contractual Choices, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Services, Transaction Costs, Water supply, H0, H7, K00, L33,

Using an original database concerning 1637 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a "competition effect" between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a "termination effect", reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re-auctioned.

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Collusion, Franchise bidding, Local public services, Yardstick competition, D42, D44, L50, L51,