From earliest times, Muslims were a visible presence along the Indian Ocean of East Africa, coming from different locations in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, and elsewhere. Islam moved inland in Kenya and surrounding countries during the nineteenth century, largely brought by traders. Kenyan Islam is divided along structural, ethnic, personality, geographical, and doctrinal lines, resulting in a divided community, accounting for perhaps 30% of the population. Despite the influence of Iran and Libya, Kenya has successfully contained radical Islam, especially following the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi, but Islamic discontent is unabated since the root causes of societal discontent remain unresolved. The short‐lived effort by Shaikh Khalid Balala proved more of an irritant than a threat to the government, which continues to dole out bits of patronage to coastal and Somali Muslims in the country's northeast.

Islam is spreading rapidly in sub‐Saharan Africa, home of more than 150 million Muslims. African Islam is local Islam, responsive to local histories in cultures as diverse as the countries considered in this study – Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa. Islam provides a source of communal identity to those experiencing rapid change, populations affected by secularization, unemployment, corrupt and ineffectual governments, and the intrusions of global media. The spread of Islam ascends as respect for the state declines. Ironically, the same Muslim believers who rail against Western materialism are keen on adopting the most modern technologies to communicate with members, and to find access to employment and economic opportunities in the West. As for Islamic fundamentalists (Islamists) the danger is that given Africa's porous borders and weak state structures, such groups can move about easily, feeding on popular discontent. Often more political than theological in aspirations, there is no certainty that the Islamist position will advance in Africa. Opposition includes central governments, many of them with Muslims in key positions, and numerous traditional Islamic rulers and brotherhoods, more moderate in outlook. The extent to which imposition of Sharia, traditional Islamic law, is introduced in a country can be a barometer of the extent of Islamic influence. This timely study is based on extensive field research, including oral interviews, the study of contemporary local sources, and historical research by two scholars with long familiarity with the subject.

Charles Atangana (c. 1880–1943) is an African chief whose career defies easy categorization. He was one of several thousand Beti headman's sons in central Cameroon, and not in the line of succession to replace his father as lineage chief within this acephalous society. However, he became a houseboy to the Germans who moved to the Yaounde district in the 1880s, was sent to a mission school by them, and rose from being medical assistant, clerk and interpreter to Oberhäuptling, or Paramount Chief, of this group of perhaps 500,000 persons in 1914. No sooner had he achieved a position of power than he lost it with the coming of World War I. Atangana led the German exodus to Spanish Guinea, and then was sent to Spain by the Germans, who expected him to testify on their behalf at the Versailles peace talks, but he was never called on. After returning to Cameroon he was eventually returned to a position of power by the French, who never had the complete confidence in him the Germans had shown. The 1920s and 1930s brought increasing difficulties to Atangana and other appointed Beti chiefs. To begin with, chiefs were an alien institution imposed on the Beti; the French were not satisfied with them because few of them could deliver the tax revenues and workers for public-works projects in the desired quantities; the Beti became increasingly estranged from them because they did not care for the heavy demands they made. As a generation of school-educated Beti emerged in the 1930s, the chiefs' role was increasingly questioned. Atangana could never be considered a resistance figure; he believed it was useless for the Beti to fight the Europeans, and he accepted the religion and culture of the Europeans. At the same time he did much to advance African interests. He often interceded with the Europeans on behalf of individual Africans, and actively supported campaigns like the sleeping-sickness eradication effort of the French. Within the limited possibilities open to him, he steered a middle course, as he saw it.

Current global tensions and the spread of terrorism have resurrected a largely negative perception of Islamic society in the West, an ill will fueled by centuries of conflict and prejudice. Shedding light on the history behind these hostile feelings, this book traces the Western image of Islam from its earliest days to recent times. The book establishes four basic themes around which the image of Islam gravitates throughout history: the Prophet as Antichrist, heretic, and Satan; the Prophet as Fallen Christian, corrupted monk, or Arab Lucifer; the prophet as sexual deviant, polygamist, and charlatan; and the Prophet as Wise Easterner, Holy Person, and dispenser of wisdom. A feature of the book is a strong portrayal of Islam in literature, art, music, and popular culture, drawing on such sources as Cervantes's Don Quixote; the Orientalism of numerous visual artists; the classical music of Monteverdi and Mozart; and more recent cultural manifestations, such as music hall artists like Peter Dawson, Charles Trenet, and Edith Piaf; and stage or silver screen representations like The Garden of Allah, The Sheik, Aladdin, and The Battle of Algiers. The book argues that an outpouring of positive information on basically every aspect of Islamic life has yet to vanquish the hostile and malformed ideas from the past. Conflict, mistrust, and misunderstanding characterize the Muslim-Christian encounter, and growing examples of cooperation are often overshadowed by anger and suspicion.

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