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Existing literature on bias and third-party conflict management mainly focuses on the dichotomy of whether the mediator’s bias as a whole can contribute to mediation onset and outcomes. I argue that we need more specific and disaggregated research on the mediator’s bias because the side on which a prospective mediator’s bias lies may significantly affect the likelihood of mediation onset. Why are some biased mediations initiated by third parties while others are not? By disentangling the mediator’s bias and by distinguishing between different levels of bias, I find that the likelihood of mediation onset tends to increase if the potential mediator shares a closer political relationship with a conflicting state that has greater national capabilities or that is more authoritarian than the counterparty. However, the effect is largely conditional on the levels of the mediator’s bias, where a more obvious level of bias is more likely to facilitate mediation initiation. This article advances our understanding of bias and international conflict mediation.

Scholars often assume that courts in authoritarian regimes cannot credibly protect foreign investors’ interests because these institutions lack judicial independence. In this article, we construct a novel data set on multinational corporations’ litigation activities in Chinese courts from 2002 to 2017. This supports the first systematic case-level analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit outcomes in an authoritarian judiciary. We find that foreign companies frequently engage in litigation in authoritarian courts. Moreover, we theoretically and empirically distinguish between two types of government–business ties in terms of their effectiveness in incentivizing the host state to protect foreign investors’ interests. We argue that ad hoc, personal political connections deliver only trivial lawsuit success for multinational enterprises, while formal corporate partnerships with regime insiders can lead the state to structurally internalize foreign investors’ interests. In particular, we demonstrate that joint venture partnerships with state-owned enterprises help foreign firms obtain more substantial monetary compensation than other types of multinational enterprises. By contrast, the personal political connections of foreign firms’ board members do not foster meaningful judicial favoritism. These findings are robust to tests of alternative implications, matching procedures, and subsample robustness checks. This article advances our understanding of multinational corporations’ political risk in host countries, government–business relations, and authoritarian judicial institutions.

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