Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Are natural resources a "curse" or a "blessing"? The empirical evidence suggests either outcome is possible. The paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: C12, C13, E01, F43, K42, O41, Q30.

We provide cross-country evidence that rejects the traditional interpretation of the natural resource curse. First, growth depends negatively on volatility of unanticipated output growth independent of initial income, investment, human capital, trade openness, natural resource dependence and population growth. Second, the direct positive effect of resources on growth is swamped by the indirect negative effect through volatility. Third, with well developed financial sectors, the resource curse is less pronounced. Fourth, landlocked countries with ethnic tensions have higher volatility and lower growth. Fifth, restrictions on the current account raise volatility and depress growth whereas capital account restrictions lower volatility and boost growth. Our key message is thus that volatility is a quintessential feature of the resource curse.

Environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of dean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a seoond-best framework of optimal taxation. Households consume both dean and dirty commodities. Degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the eonsumption of dirty private and public goods, but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities. The "double dividend" hypothesis, i.e. raise the dirt tax and reduce the Iabour tax in order to enhance both environmental quality and employment, fails. Inaeased environmental concem implies a higher dirt tax, a lower tax on labour, less employment and economic activity and a deaner environment. if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and between dean and dirty goods is small, public consumption eapanda whIle private mnsumpdon eontracts. Otherwise, public consumption falls.