Simple SummaryIn many cases, different animal welfare inspections are taking place at an animal farm over time, as the farmer has to comply with both the legislation and with various private standards. In this study, we compared official inspections carried out by CAB (the County Administrative Board, a governmental agency) with private inspections carried out by Arla Foods (a private company) on dairy farms in one Swedish county. For example, we looked at seasonal effects and compared the incidence of different non-compliances. This study shows that long time periods were sometimes allowed for correction, that follow-up systems are diverse, and that there were differences in the inspection result between CAB and Arla due to different focuses during the inspections. Dirty dairy cattle were, however, a common non-compliance found by both CAB and Arla. Tie-stall housing and winter season (Dec–Feb) were risk factors for non-compliance, while the risk was lower for both CAB and Arla to find non-compliances at organic farms compared to conventional farms. We conclude that the presence of both similarities and differences between different control systems underlines the need for transparency, predictability, and clarity of inspections.AbstractFarmers often have to comply with several sets of animal welfare regulations, since private standards have been developed in addition to legislation. Using an epidemiological approach, we analysed protocols from animal welfare inspections carried out in Swedish dairy herds by the County Administrative Board (CAB; official control of legislation) and by the dairy company Arla Foods (private control of Arlagården standard) during 2010–2013 in the county of Västra Götaland. CAB and Arla inspections were not carried out simultaneously. We aimed to identify common non-compliances, quantify risk factors of non-compliance, and investigate if non-compliances were based on animal-, resource-, or management-based requirements, as well as determining the time period allowed for achieving compliance. Non-compliance was found in 58% of CAB cases, and 51% of Arla cases (each case comprising a sequence of one or several inspections). Dirty dairy cattle was one of the most frequent non-compliances in both control systems. However, the differences in control results were large, suggesting a difference in focus between the two systems. Tie-stall housing and winter season (Dec–Feb) were common risk factors for non-compliance, and overall organic farms had a lower predicted number of non-compliances compared to conventional farms. The presence of both similarities and differences between the systems underlines the need for transparency, predictability, and clarity of inspections.

In the field of animal welfare science, the main focus has traditionally been on the risk factors for, and prevention of, animal welfare problems. More recently, the topic of measuring animal welfare at the individual level or at the group level has attracted substantial attention among animal welfare scientists. Furthermore, research into the content and structure of various regulations-including both official legislation and private standards-and their effects on animal welfare outcomes is growing. However, the amount of research related to compliance with animal welfare regulations is still extremely limited. In this review, we aim at illuminating the concept of compliance, how it can be measured within different audit systems, and the scientific challenges encountered when comparing different regulations in terms of compliance. In addition, we analyse and discuss different drivers for compliance, as well as the obstacles and complications in relation to various inspection and follow-up approaches in cases of non-compliance. We conclude that if participation in voluntary private animal welfare schemes is to be used as one of the variables when applying a risk-based approach to official animal welfare control, then the methods of measuring and accounting for compliance within such schemes must be clearly reported.

Both the planning of EurSafe2021 and the origin of this book were profoundly influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic, and we are extremely pleased to see that so many contributions still arrived. We would like to thank all authors for sharing their work and insights and all reviewers for their muchappreciated expertise on the vast range of topics. We are grateful for the support and encouragement received from the EurSafe board and Svenja Springer, in preparing this conference despite the challenging circumstances. Our special thanks go to

A key issue in food governance and public administration is achieving coordinated implementation of policies. This study addressed this issue by systematically comparing the governance of animal welfare in Norway and Sweden, using published papers, reports, and legal and other public information, combined with survey and interview data generated in a larger research project (ANIWEL). Governing animal welfare includes a number of issues that are relevant across different sectors and policy areas, such as ethical aspects, choice of legal tools, compliance mechanisms and achieving uniform control. Based on the challenges identified in coordinating animal welfare in Norway and Sweden, relevant organisational preconditions for achieving uniform and consistent compliance were assessed. The results showed that Sweden’s organisation may need more horizontal coordination, since its animal welfare management is divided between multiple organisational units (Swedish Board of Agriculture, National Food Agency and 21 regional County Administration Boards). Coordination in Norway is managed solely by the governmental agency Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA), which has the full responsibility for inspection and control of food safety, animal health, plant health, as well as animal welfare. Thus, Norway has better preconditions than Sweden for achieving uniformity in animal welfare administration. However, in Norway, the safeguards for the rule of law might be an issue, due to NFSA acting as de facto “inspector”, “prosecutor” and “judge”.

Dirty cattle have been commonly recorded in official animal welfare inspections in Sweden for years. The relevant authorities have initiated work to better understand the causes of dirty cattle, in order to improve compliance and standardize the grounds for categorizing a farm as non-compliant with welfare legislation when dirty animals are present. This study investigated the occurrence of dirty cattle in official animal welfare controls, on Swedish cattle farms, and examined farmers’ views on the reasons for non-compliance and on key factors in keeping animals clean. The data used were collected by animal welfare inspectors at the county level during the regular official inspections of 371 dairy and beef cattle farms over two weeks in winter 2020. In addition to completing the usual inspection protocol, the inspectors asked farmers a set of questions relating to why their animals were clean or dirty. Dirty cattle were found on 49% of the farms inspected, but only 33% of the farms were categorized as being non-compliant with Swedish welfare legislation. According to inspectors and farmers, dirtiness in cattle depends mainly on management routines, which is a promising result since routines can be improved. The results also revealed a need for better guidance for inspectors and farmers on when dirtiness should be categorized as non-compliance with animal welfare legislation.