In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

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In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase

In recent years, mounting attention has been paid to ecological environmental management in coal mining areas in China. This paper conducts a system dynamics (SD) model for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas. Firstly, the whole causal loop diagram of the system is built to illustrate the general system. Secondly, five subsystems are presented according to the causal loop diagram. Then, given the stable investment for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas, our objective is to find a better allocation that can get the best ecological environmental quality in coal mining areas. Notably, we present six allocations of the investment for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas. The results show that, in allocation 4, we can get the best ecological environmental quality in coal mining areas. That is, the best improvement of mining environment can be achieved by distributing the treatment cost highly on the proportion of investment in green vegetation.

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