Various studies in behavioral genetics have shown that the shared environment does not explain a large part of the variation in the behavior of children. From this finding it is concluded that the family does not have much impact on the development of children. This conclusion (and similar ones) rests on the assumption that findings concerning variation in behaviors can be translated into terms of development. However, the possibility of a translation is not self-evident, as various critics have pointed out. The assumptions on which the method is based and which yields the data of behavior genetics does not match reality, according to critics. The statistical method assumes additivity, while reality is interactive. In this paper it is argued that a translation of behavior genetic data in terms of development requires an interpretative device, which is modelled on the notion of development as a dynamic interactive process.

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Behavior genetics W Cause and variation W Child rearing W Development W Dynamic systems W Interaction and additivity W Nature and nurture W Shared environment

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We analyzed how philosophers of education received the 'antifoundationalist' turn in epistemology, particularly with respect to its practical relevance. Our main conclusion is, that antifoundationalist philosophers of education discharge the primacy of epistemology, replacing it by a primacy of commitment. Consequently, they no longer understand practical relevance in terms of contributing to 'improved' foundations for educational judgement. Stressing the contextual embedding of any justification, they rather concentrate on demonstrating the restrictive, excluding, implications of any educational judgement. We check the tenability of this position against some critical objections. Finally, we contrast the 'new normativity' that emerges from this contextualist approach with traditional, prescriptive normativity as well as with the non-prescriptive normativity of the Frankfurt School from the nineteen-seventies.