No abstract

No abstract

Public goods game has been defined as a standard of experimental economics. As the game is defined, the players secretly choose how many of their private tokens to put into a public pot. The tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor (>1) and this "public good" payoff is evenly divided among players. In addition to the payoff, each player also keeps the tokens they do not contribute, resulting in a higher payoff for the players who do not contribute to public good. In this paper, we draw an analogy between a public goods game and collaborative spectrum sensing in emergency Cognitive Radio Ad Hoc Networks (CRAHN). This novel approach helps study the behavior of collaborative spectrum sensing in emergency CRAHNs, where all players get the spectral information irrespective of whether they sense or not. Minimum incentive is essential for the stability and fairness while meeting the spectrum sensing requirements in emergency CRAHNs.

No abstract

No abstract