Leaked information, such as WikiLeaks’ Cablegate, constitutes a unique and valuable data source for researchers interested in a wide variety of policy‐oriented topics. Yet political scientists have avoided using leaked information in their research. This article argues that we can and should use leaked information as a data source in scholarly research. First, the methodological, ethical, and legal challenges related to the use of leaked information in research have been considered, concluding that none of these present serious obstacles. Second, how political scientists can use leaked information to generate novel and unique insights concerning political phenomena using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods have been shown. Specifically, how leaked documents reveal important details concerning the Trans‐Pacific Partnership negotiations, and how leaked diplomatic cables highlight a significant disparity between the U.S. government's public attitude toward traditional knowledge and its private behavior have been demonstrated.

Prior to 1990, regulatory data protection existed only in 14 highly developed countries. Since then, 60 additional countries have adopted regulatory data protection. New adopters include a large number of countries with no domestic pharmaceutical industry. These countries will face higher pharmaceutical prices as a result of offering regulatory data protection. Why would countries that stand to lose from offering regulatory data protection choose to do so? The author argues that the global diffusion of regulatory data protection can be directly traced to international coercion from the United States and the European Union (EU). The US coerces weaker trading partners into adopting regulatory data protection by requiring such protection as a condition of concluding trade agreements or bilateral intellectual property agreements. Meanwhile, the EU coerces applicants by demanding that they adopt such rights during EU accession negotiations, on average four years prior to accession. He tested these claims using a multi-method research design that combines event history analysis with evidence from leaked US diplomatic cables and public EU accession documents. His findings demonstrate that coercive diffusion can take place by means of threats, and that countries often actively oppose adopting intellectual property rights, but nevertheless adopt them due to international coercion.

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