Abstract. In this paper, we consider economies with (possibly endogenous) solvency constraints under uncertainty. Constrained inefficiency corresponds to a feasible redistribution yielding a welfare improvement beginning from every contingency reached by the economy. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10]) completely characterizes constrained inefficiency. This criterion involves only observable prices and requires low interest rates in the long-run, exactly as in economies with overlapping generations. In addition, when quantitative limits to liabilities arise from participation constraints, a feasible welfare improvement, subject to participation, coincides with the introduced notion of constrained inefficiency.

We consider convex dynamic programs with general (bounded) recursive utilities. The Contraction Mapping Theorem fails when the utility aggregator does not obey any discounting property. This failure occurs even with traditional aggregators and certainty equivalent specifications. However, the Bellman operator admits a unique fixed point when an interior policy is feasible. This happens because utility values are unique at interior consumption plans and, when an interior perturbation is feasible, drops in utility values can be avoided.

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