The essay explores liberal feminism by matching Wollstonecraft's and J. S. Mill's works against radical feminist criticism. Though censured by radicals for perceiving society in binary terms modeled on the male-female distinction, liberal feminists subscribe to a worldview that is variegated and dynamic. Liberal feminism does not oppose nature to culture or individuality to society, but rather sees the ability to achieve autonomous personhood as dependent on social conditions. This insight underpins liberal feminism's attitude to the status of women: to form as rational agents, humans have to be provided with social safeguards such as education and the vote. Far from being starkly individualistic, this agenda is based on liberal feminism's perception of individual rationality as a social product.

In this article, we critically analyse the scholarly advocacy of nationalism recently offered by scholars such as Will Kymlicka, Neil MacCormick and David Miller. Their overall position is that basing nationality on culture rather than descent or religion would make nationalism compatible with liberalism. Synthesising nationalism and liberalism, according to this perspective, renders liberalism applicable in a world where nationalism is a reality, and addresses the flaws that communitarians have found in liberalism. Relying on earlier critiques of this position, we contend that the tacit character of national culture places political authority on a basis that is not universally visible and debatable. It accordingly conflicts with the strong constitutionalist element in liberalism. We argue, moreover, that the outlook offered by cultural nationalist authors seems to prize the determination of choice and deliberation by forces that cannot be reduced to verbal analysis. This new advocacy of nationalism thus suffers from some of the flaws that have made nationalism suspect to liberals since its inception.

This paper expands on the political vision embedded in Donald Winnicott’s psychoanalytic work. It comments on Winnicott’s notion that individuality is produced by society, and adds that such production inevitably involves power asymmetry. It is argued that Winnicott values rights and property as communicative devices rather than as private enclosures held against society. However, it is also maintained that Winnicott thinks that social deliberation itself depends on a preceding objective instance that may be referred to as justice. Lastly, aspects of Winnicott’s outlook that touch on ideas of welfare and distribution are examined, especially those concerning the relationships between the market and social agencies, and between the household and the state. It is suggested that these attributes point to an affinity Winnicott has with a progressive liberal trend dating back to Mill, the later manifestation of this liberalism being evident in the design of the 20th-century welfare state. It is concluded that it is for this polity that Winnicott wrote his psychological theory.

The author discusses the comprehensive outlook that shaped Ian Suttie's psychology. Suttie is seen as a background influence behind the British school of psychoanalysis, and his ideas pervade that school and therefore late-modern notions of the mind. The author describes the formation of Suttie's independent theory, and argues that his project was expressly ideological, as he tried to counter what he saw as the reactionary and disruptive influence of Freud's classical theory. Suttie offered an optimistic perception of the mind, which could serve as the basis for a progressive social policy. This perception was rooted in the outlook of early 20th-century reforming liberalism, whose preferences and prejudices it shares.

This article examines the political contents of object relations psychoanalysis, a theory that perceives dependence as the natural state of all humans. Unlike the views advanced by the classical state-of-nature models of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, object relations perceives humans in their original state as already grouped and driven by an urge to associate. Company (rather than privacy, property, or political participation) stands out as the basic right, and all the other rights follow on it as instruments for fulfilling it. The primacy of care lends itself to the justification of distributive measures meant to bolster family cohesion and individual confidence at the expense of the open market. The theory is therefore compatible with the premises of the social-democratic welfare state. KEY WORDS: Bowlby, J.; Fairbairn, W. R. D.; object relations; social democracy; state of nature; Suttie, I. D.Psychology and political thought are interlinked. Models of political institutions are based on assumptions about the motivations, anxieties, and limitations of the individuals who inhabit these institutions. Conversely, this often-repeated statement means that any psychological theory entails a political vision. Conceptualizing individuals' basic desires and aversions generates a range of possible assumptions about these individuals' relations to one another within the social frameworks that constitute the material of politics. Psychology may be perceived as a form of political philosophy. Recognizing this, a number of scholars have set on exploring the political aspects of psychoanalytic theories, such as those of Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, and Jacques Lacan (Alford, 1989;Brunner, 1995;Stavrakakis, 1999).Here, I offer a political interpretation of the psychoanalytic tradition identified with