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The paper develops a conception of marital love as a complex recognitive relation, which I articulate by juxtaposing it against other recognitive relations that figure in Hegel's theory of modern civil society (i.e., respect and esteem).Drawing on Hegel's early writings, I argue that, if love is to provide its unique sort of recognition, it must obtain between "living beings who are equal in power"-a peculiar form of equality that I name (drawing on Stanley Cavell's work) "dynamic equality." I conclude that it is by Hegel's own lights that we should reject his notorious conception of the sexual difference. However, I also offer reasons why, from Hegel's early 19th century perspective, he could consider the following two conditions as compatible: (1) equality within marriage and (2) sexual hierarchy outside marriage, namely, in civil society.

The article argues that Hegel's glorification of self‐sacrifice in war is grounded in a commitment to individual freedom. Anticipating the existentialists, Hegel believes that being a human individual—a subject who strives to self‐determination and “infinite uniqueness”—involves a contradiction with one's externally determined finitude, which evokes shame and fear of death. In modern civil society, many individuals experience their finite lives as secure and adequately expressive of their self‐determined uniqueness and are thereby relatively shielded from fear of death. For Hegel, I argue, this experience loses touch with a basic existential condition and coincides with a rigid and “spiritually dead” mindset he calls “self‐will.” Patriotism—including the willingness to self‐sacrifice—constitutes Hegel's remedy to this problematic. The state summons its citizens to face their finitude and thereby injects their lives with renewed vitality and sensitivity.

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