A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.Keywords: attitude change, cognitive consistency, dual-process models, evaluative conditioning, implicit measures If eras of psychological research can be characterized in terms of general ideas, a major theme of the current era is probably the notion of automaticity. Many aspects of human behavior that have previously been assumed to have their roots in higher order processes of deliberate reasoning are now viewed as resulting from automatic processes that may occur spontaneously and outside of people's awareness or control (Bargh, 1997;Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This perspective is also dominant in contemporary research on attitudes, in which deliberate, "explicit" attitudes are often contrasted with automatic, "implicit" attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, in press;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press). Whereas the former are usually equated with deliberative, self-reported evaluations, the latter are typically inferred from people's performance on response latency measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).Even though previous models effectively account for the differential impact of implicit and explicit attitudes on spontaneous and deliberate behavior (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004;Wilson et al., 2000), theories of attitude change still face a considerable asymmetry in integrating the available evidence. Contemporary models of persuasion have been very successful in explaining the influence of different kinds of message cues on self-reported explicit evaluations (Chen & Chaiken, 1999;Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;Petty & Wegener, 1999; for a review, see Visser & Cooper, 2003). However, changes in implicit attitudes are still largely unexplained. This shortfall has its roots in at least two conceptual issues. First, several models of attitude change do not distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes in the first place but treat attitudes as a unitary construct (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989...

In attempting to make sense of other people, perceivers regularly construct and use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception process. Noting the importance of categorical thinking in everyday life, our emphasis in this chapter is on the cognitive dynamics of categorical social perception. In reviewing current research on this topic, three specific issues are addressed: (a) When are social categories activated by perceivers, (b) what are the typical consequences of category activation, and (c) can perceivers control the influence and expression of categorical thinking? Throughout the chapter, we consider how integrative models of cognitive functioning may inform our understanding of categorical social perception.

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We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this article. The research reported in this article was undertaken while Jolanda Jetten was a visiting Erasmus student at the