No abstract

Partnerships have long been presented as transformative and effective mechanisms to overcome challenges linked to the global governance of development. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and SDG 17 call for intensified involvement and engagement of partnerships in sustainable development, formalizing a role specifically for multi‐stakeholder partnerships (MSPs). In this context, transnational MSPs that enmesh public and private to finance development, continue to flourish as a hybrid model of governance. This paper seeks to critically assess the accountability issues linked to channelling development financing through transnational MSPs using an accountability matrix, based on responsibility, answerability and enforceability, applicable to the system‐level development cooperation/aid frameworks as well as to MSPs. The article then evaluates the accountability challenges and shortcomings arising from MSPs as development financing actors resulting in diffused responsibility, limited answerability and weak enforceability. Finally, the article outlines a research agenda and Policy recommendations to improve the accountability of MSPs when they finance development.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are accorded immunities and privileges as agents of their member states as justified by functionalist arguments. They are also operationally hybrid: they are actors in their own right in addition to being functional agents. Navigating the functionalist imagery and relying on the argument that they are delegated purely economic pursuits (i.e. financing economic development), MDBs are able to eschew accountability to rights-holders that are affected by their decisions and operations. Although administrative law approaches have succeeded in increasing transparency, instilling self-regulatory frameworks and providing for independent review, the absence of external oversight of such review mechanisms and the broad immunities to suit enjoyed by MDBs have impeded true accountability to rights-holders. This article argues that, in so far as they engage in private sector financing operations, MDBs and their constituent arms share the form, function and relationships of an economic corporation to a large extent. Consequently, their immunities should be limited to render them bound-like ordinary corporations-by the domestic norms with respect to rule of law and human rights of the home and host countries in which they operate in order to make them accountable to rightsholders and to provide recourse for wrongdoings.