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The construction industry has always been bedeviled with great difficulties in sharing information among its participants. Although many construction firms have claimed to be ISO 9000-certified, there is still missing an effective channel of information flow for quality management. There are information asymmetries in quality management from internal and external organizations. Internally, information asymmetry exists between contractor, subcontractors and suppliers; and externally, there is no information sharing mechanism between project departments; information feedback is more difficult than information transferring in a construction firm. This paper analyses the channel of information flow for quality management. It proposes to reengineer current management strategy for establishing an effective information network for quality management.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to find the optimal power structure that drives green practices in the supply chain and coordinate the costs and benefits of green practices in supply chain under different power structures.Design/methodology/approachThis paper developed a supply chain of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which the supplier and the manufacturer are responsible for the “greening” of products. Then, the game theory modeling method is used to explore the influence of different power structures on green practices in the supply chain. Finally, the authors developed a green cost-sharing contract made by the leader; regarding optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a numerical simulation.FindingsThe increase of the green practice difficulty of any member in the supply chain will not only reduce the greenness of products at that stage but will also reduce the green investment of the supply chain partner. Becoming a channel leader does not necessarily mean being more profitable than being a follower, and when the green practice difficulty of the leader is less than a certain threshold, ceding dominant power to the follower may benefit both sides. A green cost-sharing contract made by the leader is not necessarily beneficial to all enterprises.Originality/valueThis paper helps to better understand the role of the power relation in realizing the industry's green goals and helps decision-makers to achieve win-win cooperation by adjusting power relations and optimizing green cost-sharing contracts.