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Since the dawn of the jet age, passengers on all jet transports, except Concorde, have traveled at about the same speed — a standard Mach 0 83-0 87 range as a practical compromise. After 27 years of supersonic commercial travel, British Airways and Air France retired their fleet of Concorde aircraft at the end of 2003 because it was considered no longer profitable. Clearly, with the retirement of Concorde, the world has lost the only aircraft offering passenger transportation at supersonic speeds. Over the past several years manufacturers have proposed new aircraft designs that promise an increase in transportation speeds. In particular, the business jet market appears to present a business case for an exclusive supersonic business jet (SSBJ). However, there is a key-hurdle which has, until now, prevented the successful launch of a SSBJ hardware program: the development cost for an all-new aircraft quickly eradicates the soughtafter business case. This paper presents the results of a parametric sizing study which aims to answer the following question: is it possible to drastically reduce the development effort of a supersonic business jet design by converting an existing Learjet airframe into a supersonic vehicle while sustaining FAA interest and approval? This paper discusses selected aircraft sizing trades and operations related constraints. The feasibility study indicates some level of technical plausibility for the case of converting an existing airframe into a certifiable lower-cost supersonic aircraft. Acknowledging the range of actual complications related to the task of economically modifying and certifying a legacy airframe towards a SSBJ, it appears that a larger size SSBJ offers significant technical and economical advantages which outweigh the ‘off-the-shelf’ Learjet case.

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The first generation of supersonic commercial transportation has seen three serious attempts to arrive at an economically and environmentally viable aircraft. The US B2707-200/300 design was cancelled early before a prototype could emerge; the Russian Tu-144 design succeeded to become the first supersonic transport but spanned only a few years of restricted airline service; the Anglo-French Concorde endured more than 27 glamorous airline service years until the last of its species was retired on 30 August 2003. This first generation was followed by a second generation of supersonic commercial transport projects in the time period between 1986 until about 1999, designs which did not proceed towards the production hardware stage. This study critically examines the anatomy of two generations of supersonic commercial transport design failures and successes in order to arrive at lessons learned free of ‘wishful thinking’. The design conditions leading to the identification of the product ‘solution space’ for an economically and environmentally acceptable supersonic commercial transport are discussed. Having assembled an understanding of the product metrics valid for supersonic commercial transports, the paper then provides an outlook for the first generation of supersonic corporate and cargo jet projects. This first generation of supersonic business jet (SSBJ) and supersonic cargo jet (SSCJ) projects spans a period of nearly two decades of development, starting from 1988 until today. The present study identifies that the product development metrics of this class of aircraft is radically different compared to the metrics valid for supersonic commercial transports. The challenges in VIP transportation and dedicated freight transportation at supersonic speeds are portrayed leading to two principal trains of thought targeting the development of the first supersonic business jet and/or supersonic cargo jet hardware: the development based on a new airframe, and alternatively the development based on an existing airframe.

No abstract