In a series of papers over a period of several years Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters have offered a number of cogent criticisms of historical approaches to creating, maintaining, and applying biomedical terminologies and ontologies. And they have urged the adoption of what they refer to as a "realism-based" approach. Indeed, at times they insist that the realism-based approach not only offers clear advantages and a well-founded methodological basis for ontology development and evaluation, but that such a realist perspective is in fact necessary for understanding and using terminologies and ontologies in science.This paper explores a number of questions surrounding such claims, provides a careful characterization of the type of realism recommended by Smith and Ceusters, and evaluates the role that realism plays in the critiques and recommendations that they offer. The conclusion reached is that while Smith's and Ceusters' criticisms of prior practice in the treatment of ontologies and terminologies in medical informatics are often both perceptive and well founded, and while at least some of their own proposals demonstrate obvious merit and promise, none of this either follows from or requires the brand of realism that they propose.Editor's note: A response to this paper from Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters is scheduled to appear in a future issue of Applied Ontology.

In “Realism and Reason” Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the “intended” interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any “intended” interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success.

In "Ontological realism: Methodology or misdirection?" I offered a detailed critique of the position referred to as "realism" taken by Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters. This position is claimed to serve as the basis for a "realist methodology" that they seek to impose on the development of scientific ontologies, particularly within the biomedical sciences. Here, in part responding to a reply to those criticisms by Smith and Ceusters, I return the focus to an examination of fundamental incoherencies in this realist approach and propose an alternative that is amenable to much of what Smith and Ceusters hope to accomplish. And I sketch what I believe is needed to advance ontology theory and practice in the sciences.

Of the parser generating tools currently in use, yacc (or one of its several variants) is perhaps the most frequently employed. However, because of inherent ambiguities there are some languages (such as C++) that a yacc‐generated parser cannot successfully compile. This paper describes a set of minor modifications to yacc‐like tools that allows them to be used in a straightforward way to parse ambiguities and, more generally, grammars that require an indefinite amount of lookahead. Required changes to the lexical analyzer are also discussed, and the application of these techniques is illustrated within the context of specific examples.