Deterrence and compellence couple demands for inaction and action, respectively, to a threat of sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that deterrence requires less coercive effort than compellence, yet expected utility theory contradicts this claim. Only if exogenous factors affect these situations in a systematic and asymmetrical manner will the claim hold within expected utility theory. Prospect theory provides a systematic and endogenous account for this claim. Experimental findings suggest the degree of effort required to obtain compliance in comparable deterrence and compellence situations. Deterrence is "easier" than compellence, but this relationship is variable. Deterrence requires less effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases substantially as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow. Compellence requires more effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases slightly as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow.Theories of coercion are applications of decision theory to particular circumstances: the use of contingent threats to alter the choices of another. In this paper I compare two types of coercion, deterrence and compellence, within the context of two related theories of individual decision-making, expected utility theory and prospect theory. Deterrence and compellence rely on threats to motivate the adversary to comply with a coercer's demands, but they differ with regard to the nature of these demands. Deterrence demands that the adversary refrain from acting, whereas compellence demands that the adversary undertake action. In each instance, the objective of the coercer is to present the adversary with a situation in which compliance is preferable to defiance.Most accounts of deterrence and compellence use expected utility theory, formally or informally, to account for the adversary's choice and to assess the degree and type of effort required by the coercer to garner success. Although this situa-

There is an undeniable trend toward the increased use of civilian contractors in conjunction with military personnel in peacetime and in war. Civilian employees of defense contractors and private military companies have become more numerous, organized, and insinuated in the American military. Should they be regarded as military professionals? To address this question, we first discuss the nature of the military profession. We then discuss the degree to which civilian contractors engaged in functions performed by the military possess the characteristics of military professionals. Finally, we discuss the results of a survey of elite field-grade officers and the ways and degrees to which they accord civilian contractors professional status.Traditionally, membership in the military profession has been considered to be limited to the uniformed personnel employed by the state who use organized violence in order to achieve state ends. Although there is limited debate with regard to whether all military personnel are military professionals -be they officers, noncommissioned officers, career enlisted, conscripts, reservists of any rank, or national guardsmen 1 -there has been a consensus that others who utilize or manage violence in the employ of private entities are not members of the military profession. Huntington argued that 'the officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded'.

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Canada owns and uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but its military services have acquired and integrated them into their force structure and operations with different degrees of ease. Service differences are explained with a three variable innovation adoption framework that integrates cost, impetus, and disruptive nature. The Army and Navy framed UAVs as relatively inexpensive adaptive innovation that would help avoid operational failures. The Air Force framed UAVs as expensive disruptive innovation that could improve performance of core functions but experienced UAVs as inexpensive adaptive innovations that helped avoid operational failure; yet these successes were perceived as inadequate. Analyzing services captures processes that national studies miss.