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The language of computer science is laced with metaphor. We argue that computer science metaphors provide a conceptual framework in which to situate constantly emerging new ontologies in computational environments. But how computer science metaphors work does not fit neatly into prevailing general theories of metaphor. We borrow from these general theories while also considering the unique role of computer science metaphors in learning, design, and scientific analysis. We find that computer science metaphors trade on both preexisting and emerging similarities between computational and traditional domains, but owing to computer science's peculiar status as a discipline that creates its own subject matter, the role of similarity in metaphorical attribution is multifaceted.

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Among empirical disciplines, computer science and the engineering fields share the distinction of creating their own subject matter, raising questions about the kinds of knowledge they engender. We argue that knowledge acquisition in computer science fits models as diverse as those proposed by Piaget and Lakatos. However, contrary to natural science, the knowledge acquired by computer science is not knowledge of objective truth, but of values.

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