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South African companies are accused of hoarding profits to accumulate large amounts of "idle" cash, as well as of being the perpetrators of massive illegal capital flight. This paper argues that much of the claimed corporate cash is either offshore or belongs to banks. It reminds that bank deposits increase when companies borrow, not when they retain profits. It shows, too, that measures of massive capital flight actually reflect data errors. Exaggerating, through faulty methodology the extent to which companies have cash or may be involved in illegal capital flight is unhelpful. It exacerbates already-fraught government-business relations, and complicates the search for solutions to South Africa's economic problems. JEL Classification: A11, D25, E51, F32

In 2002‐2003, the South African yield spread falsely signalled a downswing that never materialised. This paper provides two reasons for this false signal. First, while the Reserve Bank never actually officially declared the start of a downswing, by alternative measures a downswing did actually occur. It is this severe weakness in economic activity at that time that the yield curve pointed to. Second, short‐term interest rates in 2003 were higher than they should have been because of a mistake made in measuring consumer price inflation. Because South Africa had recently introduced an inflation‐targeting regime, policy interest rates were, as a result of this error, kept too high for too long. This policy mistake was rectified as soon as the error in the Consumer Price Index was discovered. Thus, the yield curve in 2003 pointed to the reality that short‐term interest rates were too high and risked pushing the economy into full blown recession. This is demonstrated by the fact that it was a fall in long bond interest rates that caused the yield spread to turn negative, indicating expectations that short‐term interest rates would need to be cut – as indeed they were.

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