The crisis in Ukraine of 2014 produced considerable change in the EU international environment, which not only tested its capabilities to react very quickly and adequately but also actually destroyed previous subtle balance of its Member States in relations with Russia. The EU Member States were not able to continue to maintain in these relations the "disunity" pattern, which was successfully described in the European Council on Foreign Relations study "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations" already in 2007. New turbulence pushed EU member states closer together, reintroduced old geopolitical constraints and concerns about national and international security and limited the room for diplomatic maneuver and finally produce new "unity" pattern. However nature of that new pattern remains not yet fully investigated from academic point of view. The aim of the article is to present results of analysis of this shift in foreign policy preferences of the EU and its Member States. The research is targeted to identify the nature of this change, which happened through process of adjustment to new reality, in the hierarchy of foreign policy preferences of Member States and finally of the European Union in general. The aim of the paper will be achieved by implementation of analysis of collected empirical data on foreign policy preferences of the EU Member States. The analysis will be based on typical methods of foreign policy analysis. Those include analysis of legal acts, statements of politicians, analytical literature and interviews with experts from the EU Member States. The conclusion of the article is supposed to answer to the main research question and to explain nature of new choices in the EU Members States foreign policies and its effect to the EU foreign policy towards Russia in general.

No abstract

The article presents the results of the research which, in a defined sense, aimed at estimating and characterizing Lithuania's impact on EU Council decisions. Two tasks were tackled during the research. First, it was intended to identify the position of Lithuania and preferences of its representatives within the informal EU decision-making network. Second, it was sought, if possible, to evaluate the capability of Lithuania "to make an impact" on the EU Council decisions at least in two aspects (political-teleological and administrative-organizational). In the course of the research it was established that the Lithuanian representatives in the EU Council most often informally communicate with their neighbours, i.e. the Baltic and Scandinavian countries and especially with Poland; therefore, they remain at the periphery of the informal EU Council decision-making network. Lithuania's interests have a rather narrow specialization and, consequently, it remains only slightly "interesting" for the core decision-makers. This, however, does not give grounds to claim that Lithuania's influence is null and void. This situation is also partially affected by the problems associated with the capabilities of Lithuania "to make an impact," which were recorded in the respondents' questionnaires. However, alongside certain teleological and administrative problems, it should also be stated that after in-depth interviews and opinion polls, the research data revealed quite a few positive aspects and tendencies. That is why the problems that were noticed and identified during the research do not seem to be fatal or irresolvable. Finally, apart from all the relativeness of the results obtained, the present research was important not only in terms of its content, but also in the methodological sense. The formulated methodology and approbated methods that are efficient for the research of informal communication as well as its manifestations and can be related to the degree of the impact of the member state might serve as the basis and the starting point for further studies of similar character.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 19911994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the BalticRussian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATOcentric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

present their readers with the sixteenth volume of the Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, devoted to the security and defence topicalities of Lithuania and the Baltics in 2017-2018. As is typical each year, the period from fall 2017 to the end of summer 2018 was rich in developments important for the security and defence of Lithuania. The probability of changes at the level of the international system was primarily associated with the change in the USA administration and Donald Trump's term in office. During the electoral campaign, the future president, contrary to his predecessors, assessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather critically and claimed that the contribution of European allies to the enhancement of the defensive capabilities of the Alliance are too small. Trump's position had a dual impact on the development of the European security. On one hand, it encouraged Europeans, among them Lithuania, to start increasing defence financing. On the other hand, it served as an additional impulse to make further steps to the European integration in the area of defence. At the end of 2017, the European Union began to implement the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on Permanent Structured Cooperation. Certainly, it is a small, but nevertheless important, step towards closer European cooperation. This is particularly significant keeping in mind the ongoing separation of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) and the unclear perspective of this important country. This time, Lithuania, without nagging doubts, also confirmed its intention to participate in the cooperation, and even undertook the initiative, to establish rapid reaction teams for responding to cyberattacks. Meanwhile, during the discussed period, at the level of the international system and within the European security space, dynamic processes were taking place. In the eastern neighbourhoods of Lithuania one could observe the opposite picture, i.e. paraphrasing Erich Maria Remarque "Im Osten Nichts Neues". The political and military tension between Russia and the Western world was still lingering or, for all we know, Russia's "hybrid warfare" against