Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to focus on compacts and their effectiveness in ensuring that non-government organisations (NGOs) are able to remain independent, critical checks on government. Design/methodology/approach -The experiences of the English Compact and the Working Together for NSW agreement, created in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW). The analysis of Working Together relies upon interviews conducted with key informants involved in its negotiation. Using these cases the effectiveness of compacts in supporting NGOs, particularly in their role as advocates is examined. Findings -The paper finds that, despite the similarities between the English Compact and Working Together, the NSW government has not produced similar supporting structures or mechanisms and that no champion exists to drive it within government. As a result, awareness of Working Together is low in both the NSW government and among NGOs, and, unlike the English Compact, it has had little effect on the ability of NGOs to advocate independently. As such, it is suggested that compacts do not offer long-term solutions to the difficulties in the relationship between governments and NGOs. This is because their efficacy is reliant upon the support of government.Research limitations/implications -The list of interviewees is by no means exhaustive. Despite numerous attempts, the authors were unable to obtain interviews from a number of figures approached from middle-level departments within the NSW state government. Originality/value -The interviews are original and new to the literature on compacts. This interview material is especially useful as little literature exists that analyses the Working Together for NSW agreement.

The DOE is seeking legislation to establish the NRC as the regulatory agency with jurisdiction over nuclear health, safety, and security at a wide range of DOE facilities. At this stage, it appears that as many as 200 (though not all) DOE facilities would be affected. On March 28, 1997, the NRC officially endorsed taking over the responsibility for regulatory oversight of DOE nuclear facilities as the DOE had proposed, contingent upon adequate funding, staffing resources, and a clear delineation of NRC authority.This legislative initiative would create profound changes in the day-to-day operation of DOE facilities and in the conduct of remediation and waste management activities at those DOE facilities undergoing closure and decommissioning. For the first time on a large scale, DOE plants, activities, and operations that have never been subjected to external, independent nuclear safety regulation would be required to comply with the requirements of an expert, seasoned, external regulator with broad enforcement powers.To meet these new challenges, the DOE and the major contractors that operate these facilities should consider not only the "lessons learned" from the NRC's historical regulation of the commercial nuclear industry, but also the most recent, highly relevant experience of NRC regulation of DOE facilities-especially the NRC's 1996 certification of the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plants (GDPs).Thls article first contrasts the ways in which the NRC and the DOE carry out their basic regulatory functions. Next, it describes the NRC's current authority over DOE facilities and the status of the DOE'S initiative to expand that authority. Then, it discusses the basic changes and impacts that can be expected in the regulation of DOE facilities. The article next describes key lessons learned from the recent transition of the GDPs from DOE oversight to NRC regulation and the major regulatory issues that arose in that transition. Finally, some general strategies are suggested for resolving issues likely to arise as the

No abstract