This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium problem in multiperiod planning horizons with consideration of product lifetime and carbon emission constraints. The closed-loop supply chain network consists of suppliers tier, manufacturer tier, retailers tier, and demand markets tier, in which the manufacturers collect used products from the demand markets directly. Product lifetime is introduced to denote the maximum times of manufacturing and remanufacturing, and the relation between adjacent periods is described by inventory transfer. By variational inequalities and complementary theory, the optimal behaviors of all the players are modeled, and, in turn, the governing closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium model is established. The model is solved by modified project contraction algorithm with fixed step. Optimal equilibrium results are computed and analyzed through numerical examples. The impacts of collection rate, remanufacturing conversion rate, product lifetime, and carbon emission cap on equilibrium states are analyzed. Finally, several managerial insights are given to provide decision support for entrepreneurs and government official along with some inspirations for future research.
Expanding green consumption market and precise data promotion advantages make the platform economy have a significant effect on influencing manufacturers to carry out green R&D and production activities, and government subsidies have a positive incentive effect. In this context, for the studies about platform supply chain management with manufacturer’s green production and the platform’s marketing activities simultaneously are rare, we consider that a manufacturer invests in green technologies to produce products and sell them through a smart platform supply chain by an agency selling or reselling strategy, in which the platform provides data-driven marketing technology to promote green products. Four game models are constructed to study the operational efficiency of the platform supply chain considering selling strategy difference and government subsidy. The results show that: (1) The manufacturer’s green technology and the platform’s data-driven marketing levels, as well as all member’s profits are all influenced by the potential market demand of green products, the sensitivities of consumers to green product attributes, and data analysis technology. (2) The service commission rate charged by the platform plays a main role on the manufacturer’s selling strategy choice, when the service commission rate is low, the manufacturer chooses an agency selling strategy and can obtain more profit, but now the green technology level is not necessarily better than that in the reselling system. With the service commission rate increases, a manufacturer that chooses the reselling strategy can obtain more profit, and the green technology level is better than in the agency selling system. (3) Government subsidy can effectively encourage the manufacturer to improve the green technology level, and now the platform will improve the data-driven marketing level. There is a threshold range of the service commission rate charged by the platform in which the government can guide the manufacturer and the platform to reach an equilibrium selling strategy by regulating the subsidy level.
Many governments actively subsidize the green activities of manufacturers and consumers to effectively realize the achievement of carbon emissions peak and carbon-neutral goals, while the development of a platform economy can effectively contribute to sustainable development. Therefore, we have modeled a platform supply chain using game theory, in which the manufacturer conducts green research and development (R&D) activities, the third-party platform conducts data-driven marketing (DDM) activities to promote green products, and all consumers have green preferences. The numerical example and empirical analysis methods are used to mine management insights. The government subsidizes the manufacturer’s green R&D, the third-party platform’s DDM, and the consumers’ green consumption. The third-party platform provides an agency selling or reselling strategy to sell products. Our results show that: (1) the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to green R&D and DDM activities has positive impacts on all members’ profits and on the green R&D level of products in the platform supply chain, with three kinds of government subsidy policies. (2) The levels of the three kinds of government subsidies mainly have an impact on all members’ profits and on the green R&D level of products in the platform supply chain with an agency selling or reselling strategy; government subsidies to the manufacturer are more conducive to improving the green R&D level of products. (3) The levels of the three government subsidies and the unit service commissioning fee for selling products are the main factors affecting the preferred selling strategy of each member and the equilibrium of the selling strategy.
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