Techniques from pairing based cryptography (PBC) are used in an increasing number of cryptographic schemes. With progress regarding efficient implementations, pairings also become interesting for applications on smart cards. With these applications the question of the vulnerability to side channel attacks (SCAs) arises. Several known invasive and noninvasive attacks against pairing algorithms only work if the second but not if the first argument of the pairing is the secret. In this paper we extend some of these attacks also to the case where the first argument is the secret. Hence we may conclude that positioning the secret as the first argument of the pairing does not improve the security against SCAs, as it sometimes has been suggested.

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In the last decade pairings have become an important, and often indispensable, ingredient in the construction of identity-based and attribute-based cryptosystems, as well as group signatures and credential systems. Consequently, the applicability of timing, power, or fault attacks to implementations of pairings is an important research topic. We will review some of the known results in this area.

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