We explore how support for radical parties of both the left and right may be shaped by what we call "positional deprivation," where growth in income of individuals at a given point in the income distribution is outpaced by income growth elsewhere in that distribution. We argue that positional deprivation captures the combination of overtime and relative misfortune that can be expected to distinctly spur support for radical left and right parties. We explore this possibility by matching new measures of positional deprivation to individual-level survey data on party preferences in 20 European countries from 2002 to 2014. We find that positional deprivation is robustly correlated with supporting radical populist parties. First, positional deprivation generally, measured as average income growth across deciles of a country's distribution minus a respondent's own decile's growth, is associated with respondents' retreat from mainstream parties and with support for both radical right and, particularly, radical left parties. Second, positional deprivation relative to the highest and the lowest ends of the income spectrum play out differently for radical-right and for radical-left support. A respondent's positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest decile's growth in his or her country tends to spur support for radical left but not radical right parties. In contrast, positional deprivation relative to the poorest decile's growth in a respondent's country tends to spur support for radical right but not left parties. The results suggest that focusing on the combination of overtime and relative economic misfortune may be key to how economic experience shapes radical backlash of the left and right.

The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions‐based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross‐border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self‐regulation and/or public‐private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast‐moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision‐making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three ‘phases’ of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order.

International Political Economy (IPE), as a diverse and fragmented field of inquiry, has often had trouble situating itself in the social sciences. This article argues that IPE belongs firmly in the broader tradition of political economy in the social sciences and begins by summarizing the emergence of IPE in its contemporary context, starting with the late 1960s and early 1970s debates among IR scholars on the nature and meaning of interdependence, of the importance of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ politics, and of ‘transnational’ versus ‘international’ relations. The article goes on to demonstrate that IPE has emerged in a far from coherent fashion, though this diversity and ecumenism is not to be deplored. The second section of the article argues that the core conceptual issue in IPE remains the nature of the state–market relationship. The way this relationship is viewed has a considerable impact on how the prospects for change in the structures—the normative and material underpinnings—of world order are to be understood. It argues that most IPE scholars, despite their protestations, still see the state and the market as separate and indeed antagonistic dynamics. The logic of the state and the market are distinct. Scholars need to take a final and decisive step in accepting that, in empirical and conceptual terms, the state and the market are part of the same, integrated system of governance: a state–market condominium that operates simultaneously through the competitive pressures of the market and the political processes that shape the boundaries and structures within which that competition (or lack thereof) takes place.

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