Abstract. We consider Hankel operators of the form H z k : F m := {f : f is entire and C n |f (z)| 2 e −|z| m < ∞} → L 2 (e −|z| m ). Here k, m, n ∈ N. We show that in the case of one complex dimension the Hankel operators are compact but not Hilbert-Schmidt if m > 2k. PreliminariesThe investigation of Hankel operators on the Bergman space of certain domains Ω has a long history. See, for example, [24] and [25]. Furthermore, there have been some attempts to characterize compactness of Hankel operators on L 2 spaces of entire functions. In [26] the case of essentially bounded symbols is considered. This has the advantage that the corresponding Hankel operator is bounded.There are interesting connections between the theory of partial differential equations and the theory of Hankel operators. In [12] it is shown that the canonical solution operator to ∂ restricted to (0, 1)-forms with coefficients in the spaces of holomorphic functions that are square integrable with respect to the weight function e We want to investigate operators of the formHere P denotes the Bergman projection

In this paper we investigate Hankel operators H f :where A 2 m are general Fock spaces. We will show that H f is not continuous if the corresponding symbol is not a polynomial f = N k=0 b k z k . For polynomial symbols we will give necessary and sufficient conditions for continuity and compactness in terms of N and m. For monomials z k we will give a complete characterization of the Schatten-von Neumann p-class membership for p > 0. Namely in case 2k < m the Hankel operators H z k are in the Schattenvon Neumann p-class iff p > 2m/(m−2k); and in case 2k m they are not in the Schatten-von Neumann p-class.

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Investment decisions are often characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, and timing flexibility. We use a binomial model to investigate the interdependencies of effects from profit taxation and both an option to delay and an option to abandon on investment decisions. We show that increasing the tax rate can lead to paradoxical tax effects, i.e. it may foster an investor's willingness to invest. By contrast, if we abstract from the abandonment option, such paradoxical effects cannot be identified. Hence, we show that paradoxical tax effects can be caused by an abandonment option. Our results are helpful for investors facing risky investment opportunities and for improving typical valuation approaches.

Earlier literature has pointed to the effectiveness of residual income-type measures based on particular accrual accounting rules such as the relative benefit allocation rule. These performance metrics have been shown to generate desirable managerial incentives when investment decisions are delegated. This paper further attests to the robustness of these measures by extending the result to a sequential adverse selection model with an inherent real option (an option to abandon). In other words, as long as the residual income measures are judiciously constructed, neither private information nor the requirement to selectively exercise an option derails their use in this setting.sequential capital budgeting, residual income, accounting adjustments, sequential adverse selection problem