The regulation of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination charges has become increasingly important in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand under the Calling Party Pays principle. In the absence of any regulation, mobile operators have an incentive to set F2M termination charges “too high”. We show that the setting of the optimal F2M termination charges depends on the significance of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. We also discuss the merits of possible remedies which are not very intrusive. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005mobile telephony, network externality, termination charges, L41, L96,

This chapter examines the competitiveness of product markets in Greece. One of the main determinants of competitiveness is the quality of the set of rules and regulations that govern the operation of markets. These should promote competition, investment and entrepreneurship. Heavy and low-quality regulation is generally associated with greater inefficiency and poor economic outcomes. This chapter describes competitiveness in the Greek economy and its evolution over time using various internationally comparable indicators that cover many dimensions of competitiveness. It demonstrates that product markets in Greece are among the most heavily and misregulated markets of advanced countries, though the reforms that took place during 2011–2014 had a positive impact. The chapter investigates in greater depth the misregulation of product markets, identifying possible causes and illustrating through case studies. It makes the case for a National Competition and Competitiveness Policy plan to improve the regulatory institutions and reduce regulatory burden. Finally, it looks at the successes and failures of regulatory reform history in two important markets: energy and telecommunications.

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