Adoption of Personal Health Record (PHR) applications has been slow due to consumers' concerns in security, privacy and trust, and the challenges in interoperability and integration with other Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems. This paper proposes the design for a secure interoperable cloud-based PHR service. To enhance the portability and interoperability, we use the Continuity of Care Document (CCD) for both storing and exchanging the PHR information for an individual. To provide self-protecting security for each CCD instance, we apply a broad spectrum of security mechanisms -including access control, encryption, and digital signature -in an integrated, embedded, and finegrained manner, based on open standards such as eXtensible Access Control Markup Language, XML Encryption, XML Signature, and XML Key Management Specification. To support patient-controlled encryption and privacy-preserving keyword search, we use ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption and public-key encryption with keyword search schemes, again in an integrated, embedded, and fine-grained manner.

Abstract-Accurate spectrum sensing is important in cognitive radio networks. False sensing results in either waste of spectrum or harmful interference to primary users. To improve accuracy, cooperative spectrum sensing, in which a set of secondary users cooperatively sense the presence of the primary user, has emerged. This technique, however, opens a window for malicious users and attackers, who may remotely or physically capture the sensors and manipulate the sensing reports. In this paper, we consider the attack model whereby the attacker injects selfconsistent false data simultaneously, and propose a modified COI (combinatorial optimization identification) algorithm to defend against such attacks. We also provide a theorem that detection uncertainty may exist in cooperative spectrum sensing. We intensively evaluate our algorithm with simulations, and the results show that our algorithm is a good technique to complement an existing algorithm, called IRIS.

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XACML has become the de facto standard for expressing access control policy. Similarly, XML security standards, such as XML encryption and XML digital signature, have been widely deployed for protecting the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of digital information. In this paper we present a framework of using XACML and XML security to support secure, embedded and fine-grained access control policy. The basic idea is to extend XACML such that access control policy can be embedded with the digital content in the same XACML document. The original content can be further divided into multiple parts, each of which is encapsulated by its own access control policy. The integrated XACML policy and content document is further protected using XML encryption and digital signature. This framework and associated security methods are designed to facilitate the protection, management and sharing of sensitive information.