In the EU accession literature, there is a tendency to downplay the role of discourse in facilitating norm diffusion, particularly when domestic resistance towards European norms is strong. The assumptions in this thinking are that critical deliberations and civil society activism simply lack the potency required to elicit norm conforming behaviour in accession states and that the only realistic hope for achieving this rests with the introduction of material incentives that make the costs of normative adaptation lower than its rewards. I focus on developments in the field of LGBT politics to challenge these assumptions and to specify the conditions under which discursive strategies are likely to stimulate the domestic uptake of contentious norms. I highlight shared identity as a crucial factor in the success of discursive influence, contending that under conditions of identity convergence, a cultural environment prevails in which norm promoters can more effectively ignite a process of deliberative reflection, shame norm-violators into conformance and cultivate resonance around controversial ideas. I develop these arguments through an analysis of LGBT and accession politics in Croatia and Serbia, contending that Croatia’s strong identification with Europe accelerated LGBT recognition there while Serbia’s relatively weaker identification with Europe slowed it down.

The aim of this article is to contribute a greater understanding of the processes by which nationalism passes by unnoticed in research and distorts knowledge about the past. It identifies four narrative practices typical of methodologically nationalist history-writing and explains why they should be rejected as dubious scholarship. These are: concept overstretch; selection bias; the misrepresentation of governing bodies; and the conflation of culture with identity. It is argued that each functions as a hidden authentication route, entrenching nation-centric understandings of the past as valid perspectives in scholarly discourses under the legitimating cover of scientific protocol. By increasing awareness around methodological nationalism in history-writing, this article serves at least two normative purposes. First, it emphasises the reflectiveness required for analysts to avoid co-option by ideology. Second, it functions as a critical vantage point for dispelling misunderstandings that fuel interstate disputes, interethnic tensions, and the oppression of minorities among populations understanding themselves as heirs to timelessly national property.

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Consensus both serves and threatens democratic inclusion. On the one hand it provides the means for individuals to will in common. On the other hand, it can impose assimilatory pressures that marginalize perspectives at odds with the prevailing point of view. Agonists have responded to this tension with a call to abandon consensus-oriented politics, contending an adversarial democracy more credibly advances inclusionary and egalitarian goals. I argue this wholesale rejection of consensus is unsustainable from the very pluralist perspective agonists wish to promote. In place of the view of consensus as an unattainable and undesirable absolute, I put forward an understanding of it as a matter of degree. I contend this understanding better captures the complexity of human relations and allows us to distinguish the potential accomplishments of consensus from its potential hazards.Consensus has a close affinity with democracy. Democracy provides a set of criteria for collective action based on mutual convictions, and this activity of joining with others to make a proposal publicly acceptable serves as a pathway for the realization of democratically prized values tied to freedom and respect. By aspiring to win others' support, one is seeking to rule with them, not over them. And by making claims openly justifiable to those potentially bound by them, one is going beyond self-interest to orient oneself to a common good. 1 However, the search for consensus is all too often inconclusive. Persistent disagreement characterizes the social world, and against this backdrop, the George Vasilev is a member

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was supposed to herald a new era of multicultural coexistence in Macedonia following a short-lived civil war. However, antipathies between the Albanian minority and Macedonian majority run as deep as ever, frequently erupting into rioting which threatens the fragile peace on which coexistence is forged. This state of affairs appears to affirm at least one commonly voiced criticism against the OFA, namely, that the pluralisation of public life it set in place would further fragment, rather than unite, Macedonia’s diverse citizenry. This article sheds light on the persistence of volatile ethnic relations in Macedonia despite more than a decade of multiethnic democracy. It argues explanations blaming the OFA are misplaced, and that the source of Macedonia’s fraying ethnic relations lies with each community’s ongoing struggle for recognition. Under this account, conflicts are the outcome not simply of each community’s incompatible wants around access to sovereign power, prized employment, and other distributable resources but unredeemed idealisations of how they would like to be respected and esteemed by others. The article contends that such struggles for recognition are bringing Macedonians and Albanians to interact in a manner that stimulates a sense of profound wrong-doing at the hands of the other, which, in turn, serves to fuel interethnic antagonisms and widen the social distance between each group.