Traditional stochastic inventory models assume full knowledge of the demand probability distribution. However, in practice, it is often difficult to completely characterize the demand distribution, especially in fast-changing markets.In this paper, we study the newsvendor problem with partial information about the demand distribution (e.g., mean, variance, symmetry, unimodality). In particular, we derive the order quantities that minimize the newsvendor's maximum regret of not acting optimally. Most of our solutions are tractable, which makes them attractive for practical application. Our analysis also generates insights into the choice of the demand distribution as an input to the newsvendor model. In particular, the distributions that maximize the entropy perform well under the regret criterion. Our approach can be extended to a variety of problems that require a robust but not conservative solution.

Significance This paper compares the probabilistic accuracy of short-term forecasts of reported deaths due to COVID-19 during the first year and a half of the pandemic in the United States. Results show high variation in accuracy between and within stand-alone models and more consistent accuracy from an ensemble model that combined forecasts from all eligible models. This demonstrates that an ensemble model provided a reliable and comparatively accurate means of forecasting deaths during the COVID-19 pandemic that exceeded the performance of all of the models that contributed to it. This work strengthens the evidence base for synthesizing multiple models to support public-health action.

This paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing industry's response. Government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier's production and pricing decisions. Our analysis expands the current understanding of the price-setting newsvendor model, incorporating the external influence from the government who is now an additional player in the system. We quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players (government, industry and consumers) when designing policies. We further show that for convex demand functions, an increase in demand uncertainty leads to higher production quantities and lower prices, resulting in lower profits for the supplier. With this in mind, one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact, we show this is not always the case and the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between lower prices and the possibility of under-serving customers with high valuations. We also show that when policy makers such as governments ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies, they can significantly miss the desired adoption target level. From a coordination perspective, we demonstrate that the decentralized decisions are also optimal for a central planner managing jointly the supplier and the government. As a result, subsidies provide a coordination mechanism.

Consider the newsvendor model, but under the assumption that the underlying demand distribution is not known as part of the input. Instead, the only information available is a random, independent sample drawn from the demand distribution. This paper analyzes the sample average approximation (SAA) approach for the data-driven newsvendor problem. We obtain a new analytical bound on the probability that the relative regret of the SAA solution exceeds a threshold. This bound is significantly tighter than existing bounds, and it matches the empirical accuracy of the SAA solution observed in extensive computational experiments.This bound reveals that the demand distribution's weighted mean spread (WMS) affects the accuracy of the SAA heuristic.

In this paper, we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price-only contracts. With a price-only contract, a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price, without specifying the amount that will be transferred. It is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory/capacity decisions. We measure efficiency with the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain (that is, fully coordinated) and the decentralized supply chain. We characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations: push or pull inventory positioning, two or more stages, serial or assembly systems, single or multiple competing suppliers, and single or multiple competing retailers.price of anarchy, supply contracts, price-only contracts, supply chain performance, supply chain design, games-group decisions, inventory production, policies, pricing