This paper seeks to explain an aborted attempt at reform of the Greek pension system, following a series of previous failures. It applies the framework of rational choice institutionalism in order to examine the strategy and setting of the relevant actors. The pension system had become a huge fiscal burden on the state, threatening Greece's position in the European Union. Moreover, its gross inequalities of provision and bureaucratic inefficiency were symptoms of the embedded clientelism and 'disjointed corporatism' that stood in the way of the government's self-proclaimed 'modernization' programme. In the event, though EMU entry requirements empowered the reform momentum, a combination of the strategic weakness of key actors and the entrenched opposition of sectoral interests dissipated the initiative. The failure suggests the relevance of the wider social setting to reform: in particular, the weakness of the technocratic community and the relative absence of a supportive 'advocacy coalition', beyond the dominance of the 'party state'. Faced with criticism, the political leadership sought to protect their electoral position and postponed pressing decisions. The case study raises important questions about the scope for such reform in Greece and the future stability of the 'Euro-zone'.

This paper examines how Greek actors participated in the negotiations on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that led to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. It asks: who set policy and strategy, why, how, and with what effect. The preferences, strategies, and institutional context of the actors are understood by reference to the conceptual framework of rational choice institutionalism. It highlights the role played by a select number of policy actors, seeking to compensate for the shortcomings of the state machine, but endeavoring to apply the norms and rules of the domestic institutional setting in their negotiating stance. In assessing the performance and strategy of the Greek negotiators, the paper highlights the asymmetries of the bargaining process. In particular, it examines the attempt by Greek actors to establish a coalition with its southern European partners. This limited the scope for achieving a better outcome. This paper notes, however, that the EMU agreement served different interests within Athens and that it gave an external empowerment to a domestic reform movement.

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