The use of soft robots in future space exploration is still a far-fetched idea, but an attractive one. Soft robots are inherently compliant mechanisms that are well suited for locomotion on rough terrain as often faced in extra-planetary environments. Depending on the particular application and requirements, the best shape (or body morphology) and locomotion strategy for such robots will vary substantially. Recent developments in soft robotics and evolutionary optimization showed the possibility to simultaneously evolve the morphology and locomotion strategy in simulated trials. The use of techniques such as generative encoding and neural evolution were key to these findings. In this paper, we improve further on this methodology by introducing the use of a novelty measure during the evolution process. We compare fitness search and novelty search in different gravity levels and we consistently find novelty-based search to perform as good as or better than a fitness-based search, while also delivering a greater variety of designs. We propose a combination of the two techniques using fitness-elitism in novelty search to obtain a further improvement. We then use our methodology to evolve the gait and morphology of soft robots at different gravity levels, finding a taxonomy of possible locomotion strategies that are analyzed in the context of space-exploration.
Energy systems are in transition towards more sustainable generation portfolios. In the envisioned smart grid generation will primarily depend on renewable power sources making uncertain quantities of electricity available, the delivery of which cannot be guaranteed. Current electricity tariffs promise certain delivery, and are thus not well-suited to trade uncertain quantities. However, if not traded the electricity might need to be curtailed, foregoing potential benefits for both supply and demand sides. We propose to adopt service level agreements (SLAs) that comprise quantity, reliability, and price, for electricity trading in settings where supply depends on volatile power sources. We define a characterization of the value degradation of tolerant and critical buyers with regards to the uncertainty of electricity delivery generalizing the widely used value of lost load (VoLL). This captures buyers' varying abilities to cope with uncertainty. We consider allocating SLAs to buyers using either a sequential second-price auction or the combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism that is known to elicit truthful bids, and discuss the settings in which we can obtain truthfulness in the sequential setting. In addition, we empirically compare their performance and demonstrate that VCG dominates alternative allocations and vastly improves the efficiency of the proposed system, when compared to baseline allocations that only use the VoLL. This article hence contributes an essential component to the future smart grid by facilitating distributed energy trading under uncertainty.
The imperfect decision-making of human buyers participating in retail markets varies from fundamental models that assume rational economic choices: even in markets with identical items human buyers are not rational, i.e., buyers do not always choose the cheapest option. Recent developments in artificial intelligence and e-commerce enable market participation by software agents that are (almost) perfectly rational due to their computational capacity. However, the increasing degree of buyers’ rationality might have unfavorable effects on retail markets with regards to the competition between sellers and the resulting prices. In this paper, we study the effects of varying degrees of buyers’ rationality on the competition and the prices buyers face in retail markets with identical items. We use the multinomial logit function to model different degrees of buyers’ rationality. We further model the competition between sellers using k-level reasoning: each seller computes the price to offer (best response strategy) with regards to its belief for the competition. First, we derive an analytical best response strategy (price) of a seller given the competing prices and the degree of buyers’ rationality, and show that there exists an optimal degree of buyers’ rationality that minimizes the price. Last, we use evolutionary game theory to show that perfect rationality leads to unstable competition dynamics increasing the overall cost for buyers. In contrast, bounded rationality leads to smoother dynamics and lower cost for buyers. Our insights raise the need to revisit design objectives for software agents in retail markets in light of their wider systematic impact.
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