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In this article, we explore the similarities and differences of two contemporary family therapy approaches: narrative and collaborative therapies. These therapies are contrasted by describing positioning of the narrative practitioner as sociopolitical activist and the collaborative practitioner as conversational partner. The article begins with a brief overview of the two therapies. Subsequently, we outline their epistemological genealogies and the practice similarities that arise from the theoretical assumptions underpinning these therapies. The remainder of the article addresses the theoretical and therapeutic differences in narrative and collaborative approaches reflected in the positioning of therapist as either sociopolitical activist or conversational partner. While narrative and collaborative approaches share more similarities than differences in relation to their emphasis on the constitutive characteristics of language, focus on sociorelational contexts, and critique of singular objective truths, prominence is given to the starker contrasts in narrative and collaborative understandings of politics, power, dialogue, and discourse. It is proposed that by outlining some provocative contrasts between narrative and collaborative approaches, new conversations and generative practices will emerge in the therapy room.

Thinking in narrative terms is proving useful in a number of disciplines. Such thinking has already contributed to a growing body of work in the family therapy field. Here, we seek to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the ideas developed by Michael White and David Epston (among others) to the practice of mediation. Distinctions are drawn from the problem-solving approach with regard to both basic theoretical assumptions and method. A transcribed mediation scenario is used to illustrate and comment on the techniques of narrative mediation in action.

The use of psychological explanation as a basis for interventions in mental health is inextricably linked with the historical context of research and science. In the Western world at least, researchers tend to be rather committed to the idea that they can find answers to the problems of mental disorder and that these answers will be found through what they know as scientific methods. This is a well-known tale that we do not elaborate in too much detail here. However, a revolution is occurring that is challenging not just the nature of empirical methodology but the very nature of explanation. Constructionism is recasting the way "physical" existence is understood and thus, by implication, it challenges the status of phenomena that researchers might regard as "mental."' Thus, a matter of epistemology has potentially profound implications for mental health practice.' W e distinguish constructivism from constructionism. Const7uctiwisrn refers to the tendency for people to create structures for understanding phenomena mentally, whereas consmccnonirrn refers to an epistemological position that enables people to theorize the production of meaning within webs of power relations (Monk & Drewery, 1994).

Abstract. Social constructionism is fast gaining currency as a major theory of social and personal change. Although its origins are in philosophy and sociology, social constructionism has major implications for psychology, and in particular, for applied psychology. This paper looks at some of the poststructuralist assumptions which underpin social constructionism, contrasting these with some of the major beliefs upon which much of humanistic psychology is based. It argues that many of the practices of liberal humanistic psychology are fundamentally pessimistic, in that they essentialise aspects of the 'self' and the personality, suggesting strategies of adaptation rather than personal transformation. Further, the absence of an adequate psychological theory of context renders applied psychology all but helpless in confronting issues of power and social control. P0ststructuralist theory suggests ways of theorising human interactions without denying agency, or indeed, claiming too much. The paper suggests ways in which counsellors are well placed to take theoretical and practical advantage of these perspectives.