Beginning in 1933, while working in New Guinea, Margaret Mead developed her so-called squares hypothesis. Mead never published its terms, though she made a brief comment on it in her autobiography, Blackberry Winter (1972), and the arguments found in Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935) and the research leading to Balinese Character (Bateson & Mead, 1942) bore its imprint. Beginning with William McDougall's distinction between temperament (innate predispositions) and character (learned organization of habit), Mead articulated a morphological approach to the interplay between biology and culture that yielded four primary and four intermediary personality types. Under specified but not inevitable circumstances, the conscious choices of a given people could render one or another of these types characteristic or predominantly stable within their population, giving each of the other types a definite relation to the dominant type and thereby the cultural ethos of its society. Persons of each type followed a developmental path specific to their type different both from that of other types and in its manifestations given the various relations of the individual's type to the dominant type. Mead's hypothesis was, therefore, a vision of the unity and diversity of a single human species as well as an approach to the differing psychological positioning of individuals in cultures. In examining Mead's hypothesis, this essay also takes up Mead's debts to several leading psychologists (McDougall, C. G. Jung, and Erik Erikson), and (provisionally) how her vision differed from that of Ruth Benedict.

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Psychological Association (APA), and William O'Donohue, it promises to speak plainly about issues that have impeded the widespread success of clinical psychology practice when compared with other clinical professions such as nursing or dentistry. The book covers a broad range of current and historical topics in psychology and focuses most intently on APA's handling of various practice-related issues. Each chapter focuses on one way that psychological practice has gone astray, in Cummings' experience, with a subsequent section on fixing the blunder. Some of the blunders covered include losing economic savvy, failing to take our place within healthcare, having an antibusiness bias, overfocusing on political correctness, and prizing diversity to the detriment of other more important matters.Cummings, the first author, is writing near the end of a long, noteworthy career. Some highlights include his participation in creating a foundation for the practice of psychology, pioneering managed mental health services at Kaiser Permanente, and the establishment of the California Professional Schools of Psychology. His writing shines when he is telling colorful stories of the battles he and a surprisingly few others fought to have APA support practitioners. Notably, he mentions how APA came 25 years late to Medicare reimbursement. He also tells the story of how he and colleagues, with intervention data in hand and in defiance of APA, managed to get states to include psychologists with physicians in insurance reimbursement. And he recalls how his Dirty Dozen group used "campaigns of harassment" (p. xxxii) to force the APA to bring on an Executive Director who was friendly to practice issues.Using these introductory war stories as a springboard, Cummings continues in his colorful and at times aggressive style-he notes, for example, with some pride that he was the "turd in the punchbowl" (p. 71) at a psychotherapy conference. He and his coauthor address problems that, while historically rooted, are thought to be problematic for the forward movement of practice today. The question is: Now that APA is undeniably practice-oriented, are Cummings' criticisms of APA and clinical psychologists in general as compelling as his demands of APA a third of a century ago?True to his financially oriented past, the first blunder that Cummings tackles is a lack of economic savvy not only at the level of the APA organization but generally within the membership. Here, his previous boardroom experiences serve him well. Although he does not provide the sort of ironclad data that served him well in the 1970s, he makes convincing arguments. For one, he argues that clinical psychologists have failed to enter effectively into the potentially lucrative business of disease management. He also contends that they have not clearly delineated or publicized what is different about doctoral-level services in order to have them reimbursed at a level on par with medicine and dentistry. Finally he submits they are behind in the innovation necessary to keep step wi...