work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. PPPs are critical to understand. PPPs can be used to avoid fiscal constraints in the short term due to their initial private sector financing, but without proper institutional controls and safeguards, this avoidance of constraints can quickly create unsustainable fiscal liabilities that will worsen the country's overall fiscal and development position. This study finds that policy-related government institutions increase the probability of countries having active PPP programs but have no effect on the level of expected expenditures on PPPs. It also finds, like previous studies, that fiscal constraints increase PPP use. The results suggest that governments understand the importance of institutional quality for PPPs, but may feel compelled to utilize their PPP units once they exist even if they do not have the institutional quality to maintain their use. This could have ramifications for the sustainability of PPP programs throughout the world.JEL codes: E62, H54, O18, O23

work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any noncommercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.http://www.iadb.org 2015 Abstract * Honduras has expanded its public-private partnership portfolio considerably since passing the PPP law in 2010, but concerns remain about their institutional and regulatory capabilities even in the wake of their new 2014 PPP law reform. Though this reform created the Fiscal Contingency Unit (FCU), a new independent unit within the Ministry of Finance with the explicit purpose of approving PPP projects and conducting oversight, the core responsibilities related to promoting, managing and monitoring PPP development still remain with the Commission for the Promotion of PPPs (Coalianza). The FCU is currently unable to function in its oversight approval and oversight capacity and has no clear mandate under which to function. Meanwhile, the government's current quantifiable firm and contingent commitments in PPP contracts account for 6.6 percent of GDP. We therefore propose a number of additional reforms to the existing frameworks to remove conflicting incentives from Coalianza and improve FCU's oversight capabilities.JEL Codes: E62, H54, H57, H83

work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of the IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.

This volume focuses on economic institutions defined as rules and organizational arrangements that, if they govern the design and implementation of fiscal and monetary policies, can better align those policies with long-run citizen interests. Specifically, the economic institutions covered are those that promote more sustainable fiscal management, adequate implementation of monetary policy, and more resilient financial systems. On fiscal management, the book covers public revenue administrations, public financial management systems, public debt management institutions, fiscal rules, medium-term fiscal frameworks, independent fiscal councils, and the design features of sovereign wealth funds. While pension schemes are not a fiscal institution, they are also analyzed because of the fiscal burden and contingencies that these systems may entail. In terms of institutions that support effective monetary policy, the focus is on the importance of central bank independence and transparency. On financial systems, the book analyzes the relevance of financial regulation and supervision to promote more stable and efficient markets that are better suited to confront challenges and more resilient against external shocks. Some institutional enhancements that foster access to credit and deeper financial systems are also analyzed.

Most studies of total factor productivity (TFP) and long-term production functions use capital stock time series obtained from ad hoc estimates of the rate of depreciation and the initial capital stock. This paper introduces a methodology that allows the simultaneous econometric estimation of the capital stock, the production function parameters, the rate of depreciation, and the initial capital stock. The proposed methodology, using the underlying cost function to the production function, allows for the incorporation of information about the relative prices of the factors of production and the possibility of having variable depreciation rates over time. The proposed methodology is applied to the case of the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and Suriname for the period 1989-2019 using national accounts data published by the statistical services of these countries.