Arachi G., Ferrario C. and Zanardi A. Regional redistribution and risk sharing in Italy: the role of different tiers of government, Regional Studies. This paper provides estimates of the redistribution and risk sharing across regional jurisdictions accomplished by the public sector in Italy. In this analysis the multi-level structure of the Italian government and the financial relations which link the different tiers of government are explicitly considered. Using panel data for the period 1996-2002, it is found that public policies in Italy significantly reduce differences in per-capita gross domestic product across regions. However, the public budget, far from providing insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, greatly emphasizes income fluctuations across regions. [image omitted] Arachi G., Ferrario C. et Zanardi A. La redistribution regionale et le partage des risques en Italie: le role des divers niveaux d'administration, Regional Studies. Cet article cherche a fournir des estimations de la redistribution et du partage des risques a travers des circonscriptions d'action regionale et realises par le secteur public italien. Cette analyse approfondit la structure a niveaux multiples de l'administration italienne et examine ouvertement les rapports financiers qui relient les divers niveaux d'administration. A partir des donnees provenant des enquetes permanentes pour la periode de 1996 a 2002, il s'avere que les politiques publiques en Italie reduisent sensiblement les ecarts du PIB regional par tete. Cependant, les depenses publiques, loin de fournir une protection contre des chocs particuliers, soulignent les fluctuations du revenu a travers les regions. Politique fiscale Redistribution Partage des risques Rapports entre les niveaux d'administration Regions Arachi G., Ferrario C. und Zanardi A. Regionale Umverteilung und Risikoteilung in Italien: die Rolle der verschiedenen Regierungsebenen, Regional Studies. In diesem Beitrag schatzen wir das Ausmass der Umverteilung und Risikoteilung zwischen verschiedenen regionalen Rechtsprechungsgebieten des offentlichen Sektors in Italien. Ausdrucklich in der Analyse berucksichtigt werden die mehrschichtige Struktur der italienischen Regierung sowie die finanziellen Beziehungen, die die verschiedenen Regierungsebenen miteinander verbinden. Anhand von Paneldaten fur den Zeitraum von 1996 bis 2002 stellen wir fest, dass die offentlichen Politiken in Italien die Unterschiede des Pro-Kopf-BIP zwischen den Regionen signifikant verringern. Im offentlichen Haushalt werden die Einkommensfluktuationen innerhalb der Regionen jedoch stark betont, statt eine Absicherung gegen idiosynkratische Storungen zu gewahrleisten. Steuerpolitik Umverteilung Risikoteilung Beziehungen zwischen Regierungen Regionen Arachi G., Ferrario C. y Zanardi A. Redistribucion regional y riesgo compartido en Italia: el rol de los diferentes niveles de gobierno, Regional Studies. En este articulo ofrecemos las estimaciones de la redistribucion y el riesgo compartido en varias jurisdicciones regionales del sector...

Italy is the first country to have experimented with both accruals and retrospective capital gains taxation along the lines suggested by Vickrey (1939) and Meade (1978). This paper describes the Italian experience, highlighting its peculiar features and the lessons that can be learned by other countries wishing to pursue these approaches. It illustrates the mechanics of the adjustments to the realization based capital gains tax and how far they diverge from the original proposals. The paper also draws attention to the administrative and political difficulties encountered in implementing the reform. These factors ultimately resulted in a repeal of retrospective taxation, and, in due course, may also entail the abolition of taxation on an accrual basis. The paper highlights the crucial role that financial intermediaries can play in lowering compliance costs under a proportional tax system and the effects on tax revenues.

This paper reassesses the relationship between tax structure and long-run income, using as indicators of tax structure both a new series of implicit tax rates based on Mendoza et al. (J Public Econ 66:99-126, 1997) and tax ratios, adopting a dynamic panel estimation strategy, and explicitly accounting for cross-sectional dependence in the panel. When implicit tax rates are used, the paper shows that the link between tax structure and long-run income per capita is not robust to the adoption of different assumptions on observable and unobservable heterogeneity across countries. When tax ratios are used, there is some evidence of a negative impact of labour taxation on long-run income, but this result is shown to capture non-fiscal effects coming from the evolution of the labour share. Turning to the short run, the research presented here finds strong evidence of a positive effect on per capita income of a tax shift from labour and capital taxation towards consumption taxation, which provides support for fiscal devaluations.

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