Financial incentives in primary care have been introduced with the purpose of improving appropriateness of care and containing demand. We usually observe pay-for-performance programs, but alternatives, such as pay-for-participation in improvement activities and pay-for-compliance with clinical guidelines, have also been implemented. Here, we assess the influence of different programs that ensure extra payments to GPs for containing avoidable hospitalisations. Our dataset covers patients and GPs of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for the year 2005. By separating pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs, we estimate the impact of different financial incentives on the probability of avoidable hospitalisations. As dependent variable, we consider two different sets of conditions for which timely and effective primary care should be able to limit the need for hospital admission. The first is based on 27 medical diagnostic related groups that Emilia-Romagna identifies as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care, while the second refers to the internationally recognised ambulatory care-sensitive conditions. We show that pay-for-performance schemes may have a significant effect over aggregate indicators of appropriateness, while the effectiveness of pay-for-participation schemes is adequately captured only by taking into account subpopulations affected by specific diseases. Moreover, the same scheme produces different effects on the two sets of indicators used, with performance improvements limited to the target explicitly addressed by the Italian policy maker. This evidence is consistent with the idea that a "tunnel vision" effect may occur when public authorities monitor specific sets of objectives as proxies for more general improvements in the quality of health care delivered.

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This paper examines the behaviour of public hospitals in response to the average payment incentives created by price changes for patients classified in different Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Using panel data on public hospitals located within the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, we test whether a one-year increase in DRG prices induced public hospitals to increase their volume of activity, and whether a potential response is associated with changes in waiting times and/or length of stay. We find that public hospitals reacted to the policy change by increasing the number of patients with surgical treatments. This effect was smaller in the two years after the policy change than in later years, and for providers with a lower excess capacity in the pre-policy period, whereas it did not vary significantly across hospitals according to their degree of financial and administrative autonomy. For patients with medical DRGs, instead, there appeared to be no effect on inpatient volumes. Our estimates also suggest that an increase in DRG prices either decreased or had no impact on the proportion of patients waiting more than six months. Finally, we find no evidence of a significant effect on patients' average length of stay.JEL Classification: Analysis of health care markets (I11); Health production (I12); Government policy, regulation, public health (I18).

Several studies of health system responsiveness focus on the demand-side by investigating the association between socio-demographic characteristics of patients and their reported level of responsiveness. However, little is known about the influence of supply-side factors. This paper addresses that research gap by analysing the role of hospital-specialty characteristics in explaining variations in patients' evaluation of responsiveness from a sample of about 38,700 in-patients treated in public hospitals within the Italian Region of Emilia-Romagna. The analysis is carried out by adopting a two-step procedure. First, we use patients' self-reported data to derive five measures of responsiveness at the hospitalspecialty level. By estimating a generalised ordered probit model, we are able to correct for variations in individual reporting behaviour due to the health status of patients and their experience of being in pain. Secondly, we run cross-sectional regressions in order to investigate the association between patients' responsiveness and potential supply-side drivers, including waiting times, staff workload, the level of spending on non-clinical facilities, the level of spending on staff education and training, and the proportion of staff expenditure between nursing and administrative staff. Results suggest that responsiveness is to some extent influenced by the supply-side drivers considered.

Health technology assessment (HTA) is widely viewed as an essential component in good universal health coverage (UHC) decision-making in any country. Various HTA tools and metrics have been developed and refined over the years, including systematic literature reviews (Cochrane), economic modelling, and cost-effectiveness ratios and acceptability curves. However, while the cost-effectiveness ratio is faithfully reported in most full economic evaluations, it is viewed by many as an insufficient basis for reimbursement decisions. Emotional debates about the reimbursement of cancer drugs, orphan drugs, and end-of-life treatments have revealed fundamental disagreements about what should and should not be considered in reimbursement decisions. Part of this disagreement seems related to the equity-efficiency tradeoff, which reflects fundamental differences in priorities. All in all, it is clear that countries aiming to improve UHC policies will have to go beyond the capacity building needed to utilize the available HTA toolbox. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) offers a more comprehensive tool for reimbursement decisions where different weights of different factors/attributes can give policymakers important insights to consider. Sooner or later, every country will have to develop their own way to carefully combine the results of those tools with their own priorities. In the end, all policymaking is based on a mix of facts and values.