Ambiguity, Bingo blower, Choquet expected utility, Decision field theory, Decision making, (Subjective) expected utility, (Gilboa and Schmeidler) MaxMin EU, (Gilboa and Schmeidler) MaxMax EU, (Ghirardato) alpha model, MaxMin, MaxMax, Minimum regret, Prospect theory, Uncertainty, D81, C91,

In this work we use data on response times from a public good experiment to test the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, under the assumption that the longer the time of the decision, the less instinctive the choice. Results seem to support the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, while defection is 'rational'. Moreover, as the experiment is designed also to assess the effects of the consumption of relational goods on cooperation, we are also able to state that some types of relational goods, like team working, produce additional cooperation, but make it less spontaneous. We also detect that males seem to behave more instinctively than females.

Dynamically inconsistent decision makers have to decide, implicitly or explicitly, what to do about their dynamic inconsistency. Economic theorists have identified three possible responses -to act naively (thus ignoring the dynamic inconsistency), to act resolutely (not letting their inconsistency affect their behaviour) or to act sophisticatedly (hence taking into account their inconsistency). We use data from a unique experiment (which observes both decisions and evaluations) in order to distinguish these three possibilities. We find that the majority of subjects are either naïve or resolute (with slightly more being naïve) but very few are sophisticated. These results have important implications for predicting the behaviour of people in dynamic situations.JEL classifications: D90, D80, C91

In this paper we examine the performance of theories of decision making under uncertainty/ambiguity from the perspective of their descriptive and predictive power, taking into account the relative parsimony of the various theories. To this end, we employ an innovative experimental design which enables us to reproduce ambiguity in the laboratory in a transparent and non-probabilistic way. We find that judging theories on the basis of their theoretical appeal, or on their ability to do well in testing contexts, is not the same as judging them on the basis of their explanatory and predictive power. We also find that the more elegant theoretical models do not perform as well as simple rules of thumb.