One of the more recent "hot button" issues in our field is that of outsourcing all or some human resource (HR) functions whether by fee for service or contract. Advocates from the field of Public Choice Economics assume and, in many cases, economically substantiate the case for privatization of governmental functions. 1 Even though these economists demonstrate an underlying antigovernment bias, their basic argument with supply of government services is "that agencies should compete to provide citizens with goods and services instead of acting like monopolies under the influence of organized pressure groups."* Responsiveness to the needs of individual citizens (or to governmental units to be served by staff agencies, for that matter) is best obtained by competing within markets, with the result of economic choices by clientele between competing services. From this market environment economies in resource allocation and efficiency and effectiveness in operations are said to result. Public Choice Economists would also include simulation of market forces by introducing competition, possibly within the same department, governmental iurisdiction, or between other public, profit or nonprofit providers.?This essay departs from an article by Robert J. Agresta. 4 He argues for an extension of the Public Choice approach from one of "citizen-customers being empowered to select freely among providers of a service-whether it is schools or health care (with vouchers) or groceries (with food stamps)-and have control over the resources needed to acquire the service... to the same market relationship between central administrative (staff or auxiliary staff) agencies and the line units to which they provide services. While Agresta writes of building choice into any line-staff relationships, this article is concerned with HR service supply alternatives and alternative modes for their delivery.

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Female and male managers of the Malaysian civil service were surveyed in an attempt to elucidate the factors that have facilitated and hindered their careers. The emphasis in this article is on career differences between women and men. Many of the conditions which inhibit the careers of female managers elsewhere in the world were also reported by those sampled. Family requirements and resulting role conflict were evident. Many women have not married. There was some evidence of sexual harassment. There is a suggestion that women may suffer from low self‐esteem and attribute their career progress primarily to luck. On the positive side, and despite a government policy that has resulted in more public resources for higher education being awarded to men than to women, women managers have achieved career success. This is largely because of the socioeconomic status of their parents and the apparent willingness of parents to educate female offspring who were not necessarily the first‐born.

In this article the argument is made that the recent federal government experience with merit pay has produced misleading results. Because the program was largely a failure does not mean that it cannot work. Its deficiencies can be attributed to poor and hurried implementation and to inadequate funding. After examining the literature on both the implementation fiasco and employee attitudes about merit pay, the experience of a Navy research and development laboratory which has been experimenting with pay-for-performance for about six years will be examrned.