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Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a promotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counterfactuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.

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Few sex differences in regret or counterfactual thinking are evident in past research. The authors discovered a sex difference in regret that is both domain-specific (i.e., unique to romantic relationships) and interpretable within a convergence of theories of evolution and regulatory focus. Three studies showed that within romantic relationships, men emphasize regrets of inaction over action (which correspond to promotion vs. prevention goals, respectively), whereas women report regrets of inaction and action with equivalent frequency. Sex differences were not evident in other interpersonal regrets (friendship, parental, sibling interactions) and were not moderated by relationship status. Although the sex difference was evident in regrets centering on both sexual and nonsexual relationship aspects, it was substantially larger for sexual regrets. These findings underscore the utility of applying an evolutionary perspective to better understand goal-regulating, cognitive processes.

The personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD) refers to the tendency of disadvantaged group members to report higher levels of discrimination against their group in general than against themselves personally as members of that group. In two studies, the authors examined the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the PGDD. In Experiment 1, the authors demonstrated that the PGDD emerges from a divergence in the comparison standards on which personal and group judgments are made and that specifying that the same standards be used for both types of judgments eliminates or reduces the PGDD. In Experiment 2, the authors demonstrated that the magnitude of the PGDD was a function of the degree of informational complexity in the comparison targets. Implications for conceptualizations of the PGDD are discussed.